Policies and Narratives in Indian Livestock: Good Practices for Pro-poor Change

Shefali Misra & Ugo Pica-Ciamarra

PPLPI Working Paper No.50
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This is the 50th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation.

This study presents three basic arguments. The first is that historical (and often linear) narratives influence the current trajectory of Indian livestock policy. This creates a looping mechanism that cannot provide solutions to emerging and hitherto unknown problems of depleting productivity and growing inequality. The second is that new pro-poor frameworks (MDGs, XI Five Year Plan etc.) that focus on inclusive growth do not linearly translate into pro-poor outcomes because human and institutional systems are not equipped to deliver this mandate. The third is that new knowledge, practices, instruments and systems are required to kick start inclusive growth. Within this milieu, the study presents worldviews of policy agents, examples of pro-poor good practices and draws out new principles for praxis that could inform new paradigms of livestock policy objectives and instruments.

We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is welcome by the authors, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

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Keywords
Livestock Development, Pro-Poor Policies, Poverty Reduction, India, Bangladesh

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ABBREVIATIONS

AHD  Animal Husbandry Department
AI   Artificial Insemination
AVFO Assistant Veterinary Field Officer
BAIF Bharatiya Agro Industries Foundation
BYP  Backyard Poultry
CoP  Community of Practice
DAHD Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairy
DFID Department for International Development
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization
FYP  Five Year Plan
GoI  Government of India
GoMP Government of Madhya Pradesh
Ha   Hectare
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IIM  Indian Institute of Management
ILRI International Livestock Research Institute
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Programmes
LID  Livestock in Development
MoA  Ministry of Agriculture
NDDB National Dairy Development Board
PPLPP Pro Poor Livestock Policy Initiative
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
Rs.  Rupees
SLF  Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
SDC  Swiss Development Cooperation
VAS  Veterinary Assistant Surgeon
WB   World Bank
WTO  World Trade Organization
DFID Department for International Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
IFAD International Fund for Agriculture Development
JFM  Joint Forest Management
DLS  Department of Livestock Services, Bangladesh
IC   Intercooperation
Abbreviations

SA PPLPP  South Asia Pro Poor Livestock Policy Programme
PPP      Public Private Partnerships
DAHD     Department for Animal Husbandry and Dairy
GP       Good Practice
PIP      Policy Institutions and Processes
NDDB     National Dairy Development Board
FAO      Food and Agriculture Organization
CPR      Common property Resources
SC       Scheduled Caste
ST       Scheduled Tribe
IRDP     Integrated Rural Development Programme
OIE      World Organisation for Animal Health

UNITs

CROre  = 10 million
Lakh  = 100,000/0.1 million
1 USD  = approx. Indian Rupees 45.50
The last few decades has seen the Indian livestock sector emerging as one of the fastest growing sub-sectors of agriculture. However, the poor, both as producers and consumers, have been largely by-passed by the benefits of this growth. Both central and state governments have shown the will to reshape livestock sector policies and programmes, so as to promote a more inclusive form of growth and tap into the poverty reduction potential of livestock sector development.

This study - building on the assumption that policies are far from linear and that technical, engineered solutions to developmental issues are often ineffective to produce change on the ground - argues that changes in the current policy scenarios are insufficient to result in change on the ground. In particular, it shows how knowledge narratives in the Indian Livestock sector - i.e. storyboards or blueprints that simplify complicated problems to deliver specific policy ends - as well as institutional rigidities and path-dependencies influence the current systems of pro-poor planning and delivery. It then reviews some good field practices in the livestock sector which may help reshape the dominant narratives and government culture, thereby nurturing changes in the current policy and institutional framework which favour a more inclusive and equitable growth of the sector.

In the last four decades, Indian livestock sector policies and programmes have been largely dominated by two major development narratives. The first narrative is the productivity myth associated with the Green Revolution, whereas the second is the efficiency narrative which underpinned the structural adjustment programme initiated by the Indian government in the 1990s under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank. While these narratives fast tracked growth, they did not translate into livestock sector policies which ensured inclusiveness and efficiency of the sector. On the one hand, the breed development schemes and allied services such as artificial insemination, animal healthcare and management systems - which were devised under the productivity enhancement narrative - tended to benefit the already better-off livestock holders; on the other hand, the market deregulation and privatization policies - which were pursued in the 1990s under the efficiency enhancing narrative - did not benefit the poor because, as it is now widely accepted, efficiency and equity do not necessarily go hand in hand when markets and institutional imperfections loom large, as is the case for rural India. The Indian Government recognized this status of affairs and ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘equity’ are the increasingly common buzz words in major policy documents, including the XI Five Year Plan (2007-2012), which titles ‘Inclusive Growth’.

However, shift in major policy documents does not necessarily change institutions and delivery mechanisms, which is critical to refurbish public actions, both within and outside the livestock sector. Twenty-two livestock stakeholders - including farmers, officers in the governments, politicians, representatives of international organizations and NGOs - were interviewed and asked about their perceptions of the situation and complexities related to shifting livestock sector policies on a pro-poor path. Out of the 22 people interviewed, 20 found strong relations between poverty reduction and livestock, but none of them have been able to indicate a clear pathway to translate this vision into reality. The senior experts and government officers, who have opportunities to change the livestock development schema towards a poverty orientation, show submission to ‘outer realities’ and issues such as ‘system problems’ or frame conditions beyond their control. At the government departmental level, outer realities seem largely led by adherence to institutional mandates, delivery of schemes and pre-fixed targets; also because government livestock officers are assessed against their outputs (e.g. number of vaccines provided) and not against their impact on livestock (e.g. number of healthy cows) nor on household livelihoods (e.g. number of eggs consumed). Finally, farmers have limited relation to the macro-
level narratives prevalent at senior level or the fruition of the governmental livestock mandate and, given their scattered and sparse interaction with government officers, pose little if any trust in the capacity of policies to change their livelihoods, i.e. they are rarely aware or willing to contribute to policy design and implementation, but in the rare occasions when they get an immediate visible reward.

It follows, that unless adequate resources are invested in changing policy making and implementation, the equity base narrative which underpins the inclusive growth envisaged in the XI Five Year Plan (2007-2012) will remain a tale, and will not translate into tangible benefits for the about 50 percent of India households, those who keep one or another type of livestock asset or earn income from livestock-related occupations. Their inclusion in gaining from growth is a sine qua non to ensuring a pro-poor growth.

An analysis of some pro-poor Good Practices in the livestock sector - collated by the NDDB-FAO South Asia Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Programme - suggests possible ways to promote pro-poor changes in policy design and implementation. The first evidence is that the productivity-enhancing, efficiency-enhancing and equity-based narratives can be complementary, i.e. under appropriate conditions can be jointly pursued and are mutually beneficial. The second evidence is that unless livestock is seen in the broader developmental context, unless the multiple objectives and behaviours of the livestock dependent households are understood, there are few chances for livestock sector policies to be effectively pro-poor. The third lesson, which is a corollary of the second, is that a variety of policy actors need to act together to design and implement livestock sector policies which are inclusive, as in many cases these policies / programmes do not pertain to the Livestock Department, but rather also to the Forest Department or to the Rural Development Department or others. It also emerges that sometimes policies should simply create an enabling environment for the private sector to thrive (i.e. designing good rules and regulations and removing barriers), because many of the Good Practices show how private companies are able to make a profit while dealing with smallholders, provided that they are able to develop innovative business models (government’s support may thus be needed for private firms to experiment with new business models which involve the poor - as suppliers, clients or employers). The fourth lesson, which is not new but still requires attention, is that participatory planning and inclusive processes are critical to design effective programmes and policies, as institutional reforms cannot be simply planned in board rooms but must be context specific to succeed. This requires that the government further delegates and decentralises power - as mandated by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment of 1993 - to Panchayati Raj Institutions at the village, block and district level.

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1 A method, process or activity that has been adopted and is particularly effective at delivering a particular outcome
1. INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades, Indian livestock sector has been one of the fastest growing sub-sectors of agriculture but the poor, both as producers and consumers, have been largely by-passed by the benefits of this growth. The Indian Government has recognized this status of affairs and has prioritised ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘equity’ in major national policy documents, including the XI Five Year Plan (2007-2012), which titles ‘Inclusive Growth’, and the National Farmers Policy. However, detailed strategies to implement these ‘inclusive’ policies still need to be formulated and implemented in the livestock sector.

This study - building on the assumption that policies are far from linear and that technical, engineered solutions to developmental issues are often ineffective to produce change on the ground - analyses the livestock policy making process in the Indian continent with a focus on knowledge narratives and institutional rigidities, and attempts to unpack the nuances of policy design and policy implementation processes in the last decades. It then reviews some good practices in the livestock sector which may help reshape the dominant knowledge narratives and policy implementation mechanisms, thereby nurturing effective changes in the current livestock policy framework.

The next chapter introduces to the methodology, which is based both on literature review and interviews of key livestock stakeholders, based upon the Nine Square Mandala, a framework developed by Swiss National Science Foundation. Chapter three and four review policy narratives and present some associated examples of livestock sector policies in the Indian context. In particular, chapter three presents an overview of historical productivity enhancement and emerging equity based livestock knowledge narratives. The chapter highlights looping tendencies within policy formulation and implementation that impact on current trends in the livestock sector. It then provides an overview of the institutional stakeholders within the livestock domain and reviews their roles and mandates. Chapter four defines the historical context further through a review of ratified national/state policies and highlights why particular narratives were chosen and to which policy end.

Chapter five of the study engages with the real world of livestock policy making and implementation and presents findings of a primary research conducted at state level in Madhya Pradesh, at the central level in New Delhi and at the international level in the United Kingdom. Herein the focus of enquiry is, ‘what do the worldviews of livestock policy agents say about Indian livestock policies and its outcomes?’ Drawing together the discussions based on primary and secondary research, the study outlines the need to re-negotiate livestock narratives and highlights the role of knowledge building to contribute to the livestock’s ‘learning edge’.

Chapter six draws from good practices and field innovations harnessed by the South Asia Pro Poor Livestock Policy Programme to clarify the tenants of the equity based mandate and identifies some new principles for praxis. Chapter seven concludes by arguing that the Indian livestock requires an innovative roadmap to realise the vision of the seminal XI Five Year Plan of the Indian Government, which titles ‘Inclusive Growth’ as its ultimate aim. A primary step towards this goal is the need to refurbish dominant narratives within Indian livestock through development of newer practices. It is suggested that critical lessons for praxis can be drawn out of ‘Good Practices’ which may help decision makers formulate and implement policies, programmes and institutional interventions which ensure a development of the livestock sector, which is both efficient and equitable.

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2 SA PPLPP is a programme of NDDB and FAO. Information on the same is accessible at www.sapplpp.org
2. METHODOLOGY

This study unpacks Indian livestock policy cultures within its real world of formulation and implementation by looking at knowledge narratives and institutional rigidities through both literature review and research based interviews. Both the literature review and research based interviews build on three theoretical bearings. The first is the theory of **Structuration** which, according to Giddens’ (1998), represents those human actions performed within the context of a pre-existing social structure that produces and reproduces policy prototypes. The second is Foucault’s (1982) theory of **Power**, wherein acceptable knowledge is considered a source of power, and can also assume the authority of the truth until newer knowledge is created. The third is Lipsky’s (1980) study of **street level bureaucracy**, wherein bureaucratic work cultures bring forth rigidity and dehumanized tendencies among policy implementers resulting out of neglect of their roles in informing policy.

Given that the Government of India is the primary stakeholder leading livestock development, a large part of the literature review is dedicated towards analysing livestock sector policies and systems, both at national and state level. Research-based interviews aimed at capturing worldviews of 22 livestock policy agents (table 1) are based on an adapted version of the Nine Square Mandala (diagram 1), a framework developed by Swiss National Science Foundation (further researched by Baumgartner and Hogger, 2004). The Nine Square Mandala applies peoples own opinions to define their needs and response strategies, builds on the Sustainable Livelihood Framework and enables to move away from sectoral/linear logic (like economic preconditions or outputs) and to adopt a multifocal lens of analysis. The adapted version of the Mandala used in this study places the policy agent at the centre of research and analyses her/his inner and outer realities. It does this in the light of eminent power-knowledge interfaces that influence their functionality (for example their individual (inner) opinions about how a policy should be formed vis-à-vis their professionals (outer) stands on policy making and its outputs).

Interviews did not proceed with predefined questions but rather delved into the interviewee’s mindset through free association using the Mandala as a framework. Focus was however given to identify interviewees’ institutional adaptation tendencies, their perceived and ‘imagined order of things’ that influenced policy decisions, which as summarised by Sen (1987) are ‘human choices that cannot be explained as maximising behaviour but result from specific, not fully coordinated decisions taken in situations of partial information and institutional reflection’. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and quotes drawn only specify the policy agent’s level and position.
### Table 1: Profile of interviewees.

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<td>L1</td>
<td>International livestock experts, Policy analysts, Ex-India country representative</td>
<td>ILRI, FAO, University of East Anglia</td>
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<tr>
<td>L2</td>
<td>National consultants, Ex-Government Director, Academic Professor, Donor Representative, Regional coordinator and programme manager of a Livestock Programme</td>
<td>MoA, SA-PPLPP, IIM, Planning Commission, NGO-BAIF, SDC</td>
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<tr>
<td>L3</td>
<td>Livestock Farmers, Ex-Agriculture Minister, Agriculture Production Commissioner, Principal Secretary, Director, Under Secretary, Veterinary Assistant Surgeon, Assistant Veterinary Field Officers &amp; Para-vets</td>
<td>DAHD, Government of Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>12</td>
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Diagram 1: The Nine Square Mandala

Defining rural livelihoods beyond sectoral logic through a multi focal approach
3. KNOWLEDGE NARRATIVES: DEFINING INDIA’S LIVESTOCK PEDAGOGY

3.1 Trends in Indian Livestock Development

Historically, Indian livestock has followed two distinct trends; one signifies profound growth in some sub-sectors of livestock led by productivity enhancement initiatives, while the other highlights emerging regional and sectoral inequalities coupled with depleting labour engagements. Both these trends are influenced by substantive knowledge narratives that inform livestock policy making, a process which is often led by a need for national policy standardization, efficiency, acceptability and what is deemed by planners as ‘appropriate resource allocation’.

Livestock is what Ellis (2005) calls ‘a springboard for livelihood diversification’ and represents disposition of in-valuable assets for a large multitude of the global poor, nearly 2.6 billion of whom live on incomes below US$2 per day (World Bank, 2009). Livestock provide risk coverage, nutritional security, cash income, draught and hauling power, are typically cared of by women and, in India, are more equally distributed compared to land (LID 1999, Mellor 2004, Ali 2007a). This sector has an estimated value of INR 1.5 billion (US$ 33.6 million) in 2002-2003 (CSO, 2003) and provides employment to almost 18 million people, with women constituting about 70 percent of labour force. It currently contributes 6 percent to India’s GDP and 25 percent to the agriculture GDP and in the last decade it has grown at an annual rate of 5.6 percent, which is higher than 3.3 percent growth in agriculture (Ali 2007a). In addition, livestock are critical to the livelihoods of nearly 75 percent of Indian rural households, of which the majority are small and marginal farmers and landless (Brithal et al, 2006).

Since Indian independence, livestock trajectory (as a sub-sector of agriculture) has historically functioned within the backdrop of the green revolution initiated in the 1960s, wherein a favourable interplay of research, input-supply, diffusion based extension, marketing and price support enabled India to increase staple productivity and food supply to a rapidly growing population. Livestock aligned itself to this national food security mandate by mounting productivity enhancement programmes - the most successful outcome of which emerged within the dairy sector. Here rural marketing linkages initiated under Operation Flood in 1970 created a nation-wide grid of dairy cooperatives that increased India’s milk production from 21.2 million MT in 1968 to 102 million MT in 2007 and generated employment for almost 13 million families. Operation Flood is viewed by the World Bank (1997) as a twenty year experiment confirming the Rural Development Dream.

However, the Indian livestock sector was found growing mainly through contribution of village producers (in dairy) and commercial production (in poultry). While these sectors grew in institutional strength, gained a competitive edge, built consumer demand and contributed to national production, the share of meat in livestock products stagnated in all sectors other than commercial poultry. Trends were indicative that small livestock

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3 Operation Flood was implemented in three stages (1970-1996) and linked milk producers throughout India with consumers in over 700 towns and cities, reducing seasonal and regional price variations while ensuring that the producer gets fair market prices in a transparent manner. Its bedrock was the setting up of village milk producers’ cooperatives, which procured milk and provided inputs and services to members.
holders were increasingly leaving livestock production for other engagements and shifts in cattle rearing from subsistence to semi-commercial level were not necessarily leading to enhanced employment or labour engagements (Jha 2008). The utopia created by well deserved successes in the sector was thus dampened by civil society protagonists who questioned why productivity was being prioritized over poverty reduction and employment, despite the role livestock could play in contributing to both.

Current trends, which are indicative of changing food consumption patterns leading to demand for high-value livestock commodities like milk, meat and eggs, provide possibly new opportunities for taking the livestock sector on a more balance and pro-poor development pathway (IFPRI, 1999). Projections are of near three fold increase in consumption of livestock products by 2020 (milk: 132 MT; meat: 9.0 MT; and eggs: 49 billion). In such a scenario, there are opportunities for the poor livestock rearers to benefit, as they keep 46 percent of small ruminants (sheep, goat and pigs) and three fourth of India’s backyard poultry (Birthal et al, 2006). However, as policy analysts and civil society protagonists are increasingly flagging, poor people are currently ill-equipped to fill this demand gap because their interests are being neglected in policy frameworks and plans (Turner 2004, Anthra 2000). This calls for deeper analysis and investigation of the Indian livestock policy making process itself, to appreciate how the interests of the livestock dependent poor could be given adequate space and attention in future livestock sector policies and plans.

3.2 Indian Livestock Policy Narratives: The Hidden Manuscripts

Policy is neither apolitical nor linear; it is rather influenced by key practices, assumptions, science and story lines, or by what are broadly referred to as policy narratives. Policy narratives can be viewed as storyboards or blueprints that simplify complex problems to deliver specific policy ends. Herein often a ‘conceptual schema develops with core sentences that begin to be held as gospel truth’ (Hacking, 2002). These narratives are often known to create repetitive analyses of social problems from predefined previews that lead to looping effects in policy planning and implementation.

Narratives often amalgamate and create a référentiel, implying that each policy begins to be influenced by a predominant global / overarching paradigm (such as globalization or liberalization) that creates compliance pressure within relevant policy sectors (Laborier and Papadopoulos 2004). In essence, narratives take on verbal and institutional forms and often shape our thinking and have a powerful influence on decision making; especially because adhering to them allows for greater certainty and self-confidence and complements notions of what one might call ‘a rational policy choice’.

Livestock as a sub-sector of agriculture is subsumed within strong policy narratives popular between the 1960’s-1990’s, which revolved around food security and agriculture modernization for productivity and efficiency enhancement. The hallmark was faith in technology, production, efficiency and the use of agriculture and allied sectors as growth engines to fuel economies and increase India’s food basket. Herein donors and governments aligned towards national food security planning, partly as a proxy for poverty planning (Maxwell, 1990). With adherence to the popular food security vision of ensuring ‘access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life’ (World Bank,1986), national policies and social frameworks
streamlined to boom grain production and economic growth. As a multiplier effect of these frame conditions, the focus of livestock was on augmenting production through breed development and allied services such as AI and veterinary supplies.

Indian livestock trajectory also reflected structural shifts in India’s broad economic policies showing close alignment to the ‘market-engendered spontaneous order’ (Sutton, 1999) narrative which emerged from the 1980’s structural adjustment programmes sponsored by the IMF and World Bank. Here trickle-down effects of economic growth were meant to accrue benefits to the masses through reformulated approaches towards free market economics and new financial regimes. Thereafter Government of India’s (hereinafter GoI) interventionist stand, long marked by state subsidies and protective regulation, changed in 1991 when India embarked upon a liberalization process following a conditional loan given to the government by the IMF and the World Bank to tackle one of the most severe macroeconomic crises in decades. Since then, the country has fostered market led economic growth, marked by de-licensing and deregulation of the industrial sector and, in part, also of the agriculture sector (e.g. reduced subsidies for fertilizers).

During this period, drawn into the national referential of economic growth leading to food security, livestock lost clarity on its goal and role, with Turner (2004) opining that ‘livestock reforms began to be led by an intersection of domestic politics, power plays, international actors and trade regimes’. In effect, policy makers amalgamated all livestock variations and diverse livelihood systems within one canvass of productivity enhancement led by price, technology and institutional incentives and allocated budgets based on this agenda. However, these structural provisions were not pro-poor and largely benefited larger farmers and commercial agents. An exercise reviewing Indo-Swiss bilateral livestock programmes in India (1963-2000) revealed the following:

... the major forces affecting the future of livestock will largely depend on the role government will play in service provision, marketing and how they will open the sector to private investments. The impact of liberalisation on regional imbalances, weaker sections of the population and the environment might be less than positive (CAPEX, 2000).

With the economic reform revealing trends of spatial inequality, major policy narratives showed subtle shifts from questions related to ‘how to trigger economic growth’ to ‘how to ensure inclusive economic growth, which benefits those most in need’. The myth of trickle down and mass productivity enhancement was challenged by new World Bank (2008) estimates indicating that, despite impressive GDP growth rates, 42 percent of Indian still lived below 1.25$ mark. Given these trends, it became increasingly obvious that inclusive growth could not be achieved by simply increasing productivity.

This saw the dawn of the new referential of inclusiveness and equity wherein livestock began to be seen as a means of poverty reduction and an important contributor to the Millennium Goal of halving poverty by 2015, a policy mandate that now guides major developmental engagements (including national policies, sector wide approaches, donor coordination and technical cooperation). GoI’s National Policy for Farmers (Gol, 2007) and the XI Five Year Plan (Gol, 2008) respond to this agenda:
3. Knowledge Narratives: Defining India’s Livestock Pedagogy

....to reverse downward trends in agricultural production, the time has come to focus on the socio-economic well-being of farmers feeding the nation than just on production and reorient programmes to become pro-nature, pro-poor, pro-women and pro-livelihood (GoI, 2007).

The goals for the Eleventh Five Year Plan for the livestock sector would be (i) to achieve an overall growth between 6% and 7% per annum for the sector as a whole with milk group achieving a growth of 5.0% per annum and meat and poultry group achieving a growth of 10% per annum; (ii) the benefit of growth should be equitable, benefiting mainly the small and marginal farmers and landless labourers and should benefit poorly endowed areas like draught prone, arid, and semi-arid areas… (GoI, 2008).

Yet even with these powerful policy statements, what really has changed at a practical level? The key question is in fact whether policy design and implementation mechanisms have changed or can change in a manner to afford better inclusiveness and pro-poor benefits to the many small and marginal farmers. It is well possible that, given years of adherence to an implementation typeface of productivity, the human and institutional dimensions of livestock planning and implementation may be strongly path-dependent and unable to show any innovation:

...room for manoeuvre is constrained not only by policy, politics, organisational modus operandi and culture but also by our own unthinking compliance to norms (Bond 2002).

3.3 Human and Institutional Dimensions of Livestock Policy Stakeholders

3.3.1 Government of India: Formalising Narratives and Framing Agendas

The Government of India remains the largest stakeholder in the livestock sector and targets an overall growth rate of the livestock sector between 6 and 7 percent per annum in its XI Five Year Plan. Its structures are characterized by centralization, and leadership plays an important role in defining sector directions. However, the government system often suffers a lack of devolved authority which reduces its efficiency in delivering public goods and services (especially a lack of participation and low accountability among field staff). Officers generally function under pressure and have to balance a powerful matrix of outputs, political interference and corruption to ensure service delivery. As a system, government staff is often preoccupied with procedure which challenges innovation and motivation. A Veterinarian (L3) with the state administration of the Government of Madhya Pradesh opines:

Government holds the key towards ensuring that links between livestock and poor are maintained. Our system is expected to be representative but the concept of ownership is different within the government. We cannot gain farmers trust because funds don’t come according to their need. Rules and targets are
Attached to each fund. Money is not the problem but our implementation works through a target fulfilment mode.

Administrative processes are top-down and formal interactions reflect a predominant culture of power in terms of dressage\(^4\) that is known to reinforce hierarchy and behaviours like adherence to orders, rigidity in protocol and delivery target fixation. Given the limitations of personal and institutional innovation, this dressage reflects in a looping phenomenon (subscribing to a cause and effect logic) and can be associated with organisational learning theories of bounded rationality (March & Olsen, 1989), which emphasise that actors make decisions along beliefs about what is valuable and what is not through an institutional ‘logic of appropriateness’ because they often cannot anticipate or take the risks associated with innovations. This reinforces a policy prototype, with policy making often reduced to following past protocol, in spite of possible innovations at the top. In other words, livestock is repeatedly used as an engine of economic growth despite increased policy determination to use it as a tool to reduce poverty and enhance food security (by directly targeting the livestock-dependent poor).

In India’s large bureaucratic infrastructure, members of the administrative services function as general managers, commissioners and secretaries while veterinarians occupy lower ranks, many of whom begin and end careers as field veterinarians. Staffing patterns are dismal with ratio of 1 livestock personnel: 12,000 animals\(^5\) (Kurup, 2003). Given that policies are often formulated by bureaucrats and experts and that field veterinarians (the street level bureaucrats of the livestock department) largely do not participate in such processes, subtle tensions exist between managers and field staff which compromise percolation of the policy mandate and efficiency of implementation.\(^6\) An assessment undertaken seven years after ratification of the Orissa State Livestock Policy revealed:

> While involvement of external experts in formulation of the livestock policy provided a wider policy vision and brought in improved service delivery and coverage, a majority of those involved in the policy process were retired professors and senior department officers. The younger generation of veterinarians felt left out of the process and many today do not know of the existence of the policy….. The policy document itself was quite full of jargon and difficult to understand like ‘transforming the growing challenges of the market place into comparative and competitive advantage through improved livestock quality and higher productivity’ by ‘experimenting with the intermediate production system, which enables small holder to gradually integrate the highly productive modern technology and management into his traditional system’….. the policy does not detail an implementation plan to actualise this vision nor does it

\(^4\) How individuals act in their workplace-Jackson’s and Carter, 1998

\(^5\) However government veterinarians represent strong lobbies and possess considerable ability to resist organizational change given their security of tenure. As an example, in Andhra Pradesh, recent attempts to privatize veterinary practice through decentralised delivery by para-veterinarians were met with resistance and could not be undertaken without ‘rewriting civil service rules that affect most government employees’ (Turner, 2004).

\(^6\) Lipsky (1980) in his seminal work on street level bureaucrats opined that public service protocols and rigidity creates organizational sub-systems and dehumanized tendencies within field bureaucrats who function as the gatekeepers of policy delivery.
In addition, dealing with annual delivery targets, budgets and corruption, veterinarians find little work flexibility or time to engage with needs of livestock farmers. Concomitantly, departmental motivational levels are low (Minj et al, 2008) and primary movers are those who bear allegiance to delivery targets like maximising artificial insemination and vaccination coverage.

3.3.2 Livestock Boards: Autonomy Leading to Innovations

While examples of innovations brought about directly by and within the government bureaucracy are rare, innovations associated with setting up of national boards that have mandates to promote, finance and support specific livestock sectors have showcased multiple success stories in India.

The National Dairy Development Board (NDDB), which was founded in 1965 under the Ministry of Agriculture, aimed to bring empowerment, modernity, and growth within the dairy sector and allowed for streamlined replication of the ‘Kheda Good Practice’7 through the so-called Operation Flood Programme. As of 2006, NDDB had helped set up 117,575 village dairy cooperatives, federated into 170 milk unions and 15 federations.

The Indo-Swiss collaboration in Kerala, initiated in 1977, helped to establish independent institutions like the Kerala Livestock Development Board and the Kerala Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation. Herein breed development protocols were set up and for the first time, deep-frozen semen technique for preserving cattle semen was introduced, and a new breed of cattle ‘Sunandini’ was developed that transformed the milk landscape of Kerala.

In 2008 a National Meat and Poultry Processing Board has also been set up under the Union Ministry of Food Processing, with a focus on harmonizing domestic quality standards with international demand, setting up meat quality testing systems, addressing environmental pollution and promoting meat exports. Whether this Board will be able to sustain a growth of the livestock sector which is inclusive is difficult to say, as the key stakeholders associated with the board are likely to be commercial companies and supply agents rather than small farmers or their associations.

3.3.3 NGOs: Emancipators and Emerging Service Delivery Agents

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), defined as ‘self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people’ (Vakil, 1997), have been often a vehicles of pro-poor innovations in the Indian sub-continent, where an estimated 1 to 2 millions NGOs operate. These organizations are historically and ideologically aligned to represent the needs of the poor and, in effect, many of them are well versed with participatory approaches and affirm representational commitment to local needs in their organizational mandates. Their strengths lie in innovativeness, flexibility and a commitment to change the realities of their beneficiaries.

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7 The first successful example of a cooperative dairy venture in the country under the aegis of which farmers of Kheda district rebelled against the exploitation of middlemen and contractors who enjoyed a monopoly in the collection of rural milk. This model was later up-scaled at an all India level.
Within Indian livestock, NGOs have played a consistent role in supporting best practices and innovations which benefited the poor such as in the field of fodder resource and common property resource management, protection of domestic animal diversity, showcasing excellence in breed development and capacity development (e.g. in ethno veterinary medicine, extension and paravet trainings). Given their structure, NGOs often work through associations and networks propagating the rights based agenda of advocacy. Successful forums include the Indian pastoral groups working on grazing rights, the LIFE Initiative promoting community-based development of indigenous livestock breeds, and the online Livestock Environment and Development Platform that facilitates e-based livestock environment interactions. Summarising the contribution NGO’s have made to livestock, an L2 national livestock expert opines:

As early as 1972 NGO’s began to link rural development to livestock. Organizations like BAIF used advanced technology to enhance productivity of non-descript animals. But strong narratives of that period criticised these efforts comparing costs of insemination to comparative costs of calf born..... BAIF also encouraged governments to seek farmer’s views in planning by taking officers to our project areas. One day, someone told us that working jointly with farmers was the participatory approach and we were encouraged to follow the ‘systems’ way of thinking .... so all forms of narratives existed even then but NGOs of that time placed development as their primary agenda and worked only for the people.

Alongside the contribution made by the NGO sector to build synergy between livelihood promotion and livestock development, emerging trends also indicate that NGOs increasingly adopt service provision roles and are outsourced activities like animal distribution, artificial insemination and trainings by government organizations. Given this new agenda, middle and large sized NGOs are aiming at specialization of services and are often not very open to sharing knowledge, skill or expertise with other civil society protagonists. This paradigm of service provision creates complications according to Najam (1996), who opines that when NGOs have to be accountable to donors, themselves as well as beneficiaries, often prioritization takes place and beneficiary needs might be undermined.

3.3.4 Donors: Gap Fillers of the Change Agenda

The Indian landscape is rich with experiences of donor collaborations that have contributed to building both productivity and livelihood orientation within the livestock sector. Donors have leveraged innovations to pro-poor gains, generated and shared knowledge, supported institutional reforms and have mounted research to contextualise livestock within the 20th century. The real niche of their collaborations is also reflected in the ‘type and nature’ of programmes they have funded over the decades.

In the early 1960s the Indo-Swiss bilateral projects in Kerala focussed on breed development and transfer of new technologies that saw over 83 percent of the adult cattle in the state converted into a new breed called ‘Sunandini’. In another phase initiated in the 1990s, the Indo-Swiss Programme diversified its activity portfolio by focussing on administrative, social and institutional reforms in the livestock sector and supported the Government of India and state governments of Orissa, Sikkim and Chhattisgarh in mounting
participatory and poverty oriented livestock policy processes. To reflect ‘holism’ in its own domains of work, Indo-Swiss also clubbed together Livestock Production and Dairying as well as Sustainable Land Use under its larger portfolio of Natural Resource Management to ensure that sustainability dimensions converged in programme planning.

Agencies like DANIDA, which places ‘human rights’ and gender equity as central features of sector planning, showcased field innovations of working with ultra poor in predominantly tribal areas of Chhattisgarh and Orissa on decentralized backyard poultry production. DANIDA developed a ‘poultry model’ focussing on incremental income gains and widened programme outcomes to include women’s empowerment and employment creation (through training of village poultry managers and para-vets). DANIDA’s attempt diversified the definition of livestock development to mean productivity + livelihood promotion + inclusion.

DFID, under its overall good governance mandate in Madhya Pradesh, also chiselled a specialized pro-poor focus aiming at maximizing choices and reducing livestock farmer vulnerabilities by working with gramsabhas (local self government) on effective livestock management. Herein DFID incorporated narratives of social rights and protection with those revolving around effective governance to strengthen the livestock management agenda.

Recently, a partnership between the FAO and NDDB – the South Asia Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Programme (SA-PPLPP) - has been attempting to address policy mono cultures by harnessing and sharing knowledge, which is innovative and bottom-up. SA-PPLPP works with local partners in India, Bangladesh and Bhutan to identify good practices in the livestock domains in order to draw lessons for policy and institutional changes which benefit the poor. With a mandate to change policy monocultures which often involves changing people’s ideologies, the programme aims to convert tacit knowledge to explicit pro-poor policy gains. Herein qualitative ‘process’ based indicators inform programme development and the ease of quantifying targets and outputs as is done in traditional projects is not present. An L2 regional officer of the programme defines this approach further:

*Some call what we do as knowledge sharing but if policies are to change we need new evidence and knowledge owners as co-travellers. This programme is like a new seed having both the feminine side of processes and masculine rationality of log frames and evidence. Within the seed lies many opportunities and the conviction that when livestock is reoriented it can do so much for poverty reduction …but we need fertile soil in the form of robust partners and a nurturing farmer for it to grow into its envisaged end.*
Policy interventions produce both intended and unintended consequences because they are rooted in assumptions that simplify complex realities for the benefit of policy making (Ferguson, 1990). The growth and productivity narrative of the green revolution witnessed this kind of pattern in India. On the one hand, high yield varieties of grains aided by input subsidization, price policies, investment in technology and institutional support generated an increase in agricultural productivity, with food grains production raising from 74.2 million tons in 1966-67 to 108.4 million tons by 1970-71 (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). On the other, some unforeseen social effects of these policy abstractions were its detrimental environmental impact and the creation of the ‘rich peasants’ - the real beneficiaries of the revolution - and the following unintended polarization in the distribution of income and wealth.

The same narrative of growth and productivity underpins the macroeconomic and institutional reforms of the 1990s, through currency devaluation and liberalization of most national markets. While these policy shifts were expected to benefit agriculture as a whole, the impacts were far from average. Structural transformations towards reallocating resources from inefficient to efficient subsectors through the market mechanism, did not translate into an equitable growth of agriculture but tended to benefit the already well-off farmers, with the resources and capacity to exploit and benefit from market opportunities (Subramanian and Rodrik, 2004). The subsidiary impacts of these reforms were thus felt in all sub-sectors of agriculture, including livestock, which is the point of enquiry hereon.

4.1 Narrative Analysis of National and Selected State Policies

The first ever National Agriculture Policy of India (NAP, 2000), announced by the Government of India on 28th July 2000, placed livestock at par with crop production and was apparently biased towards the productivity-enhancement narrative. The technology rider as a residue of green revolution, in fact, accompanied the livestock component in NAP, with extensive focus on breed improvement, development of new fodder varieties and tractorization of agriculture finding primary places in the policy (Chand, 2007). Furthermore, priority was given to those livestock sub-sectors which have showcased huge successes - namely the dairy sector through Operation Flood - whereas the scope for enhancement of sheep, goat and poultry (animals kept by the poor farmers) was still constrained. These trends invoke Johnson and Stuart’s (2001) postulation that there might exist causal relations between politics, power and the poor wherein dominant groups reinforce poverty & inequality by structuring policies in their favor.

As part of this productivity referential, at state level, both Andhra Pradesh and Orissa have undertaken major structural reforms in the livestock sector with policy statements flagging production and efficiency enhancement as primary mandates. Orissa was the first Indian state to formulate a comprehensive livestock policy in 2002. In this state, more than 80 percent of families keep some form of livestock - 47 percent of whom live below the

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4 Ferguson in his book the ‘Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho’ speaks of the bovine mystique and highlights problems in conceptualization of power, property and livestock between donors, government and livestock reasers, which led to unintended program consequences, including some dismal failures.
poverty line (Kurup, 2003) - and livestock contribute 30 percent to household income (ibid). The Orissa Livestock Policy followed the national economic development model of the 1990s, with the role of the state limited to the supply of public goods and in setting in place ‘enabling’ laws and regulations. For instance, the policy promoted: i) outsourcing of private veterinary services to private agents, like artificial insemination; ii) capacity-building of livestock farmers on productivity enhancement; iii) re-orientation of the activities of the animal husbandry directorate towards disease control and prevention (which are public goods); iv) establishment of user charges for breeding services, whose benefits are largely private; and v) creation of an independent agency, the Orissa Livestock Resource Development Society, to manage breeding infrastructure and forging PPP’s (Orissa Livestock Policy, 2002). While this set a framework for futuristic development, the policy neglected to appreciate the livestock-poverty interface so obvious in a state like Orissa and issues such as management of common property resources, pastoral systems and grazing rights were overlooked. As neglected was also the need to remodel government led livestock research and services to make them better cater for the interests of smallholders.

The Andhra Pradesh Livestock Vision 2020 also adopted a business-oriented approach to sector development, largely in line with the market-based knowledge narratives of the 1990s. The policy emphasised large-scale private sector involvement and mounted measures to create an ‘enabling environment’ for investment by building infrastructure and removing regulatory trade barriers. Civil society protagonists argued that Vision 2020 placed little textual emphasis on poor livestock keepers (Ramdas 2006, Turner 2004), focused instead on large producers and key ‘growth engines’ like dairy farming, commercial poultry, and agro-industry. Anthra (2000) identified the following stark anti-poor overtures of Vision 2020: i) policy is silent on draught power in a state where most farmers depend on bullock power and indicates that ‘energy requirements will be met through tractor subsidies’, thereby ignoring the needs of farmers who own miniscule landholdings; ii) policy promotes cross-breeding for high yield, thereby dislocating farmers needs for local, disease resistant, less labour intensive breeds; iii) policy is silent on goats, in a state where 40 percent of small ruminant population represent highly impoverished and poor communities (dalits, adivasis, landless and women), contributing 50 percent of entire meat trade; iv) policy is silent on subsistence backyard poultry where 70-80 percent of poultry population is reared by rural households, especially women, but does formulate a vision for organized commercial sector through subsidies for poultry feed.

In sum, the policies reviewed raise a critical question about equity prompting one to ask, ‘what exactly are the landless and marginal doing with their livestock’? The marginal farmer who owns 71 percent of India’s land holdings showed the highest increase in livestock concentration almost all species (Birthal et al 2006). The landless who earlier had a preference for small ruminants, poultry and pigs are found largely leaving livestock with depleting ownership patterns (ibid). Further, vulnerable social groups, i.e. the scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST), who have the highest preference for sheep, goat, poultry and pigs, showed poor rural asset value per household of INR 136,640 (US$ 3,000) for SC and INR 125,954 (US$ 2,700) for ST compared to others whose asset value was over 2.5 times more at 429,512 (US$ 9,300) (NSSO, 2002). Thus with trends wherein the landless seem to be making an exodus from livestock, small animals and poultry (the choice of the poor and assetless) remaining un-prioritized it is eminent to ask if current livestock interventions are ultimately contributing to inclusive growth.
Overall, the point being made here is that while India’s alignment to dominant economic development narratives (market promotion, deregulation and privatization) reflects a positive trend towards reaching sustainable levels of crop and animal food production, it hides variances of exactly who is benefiting from this growth. Kanbur and Jhabvala (2002) identify three troubling features of such growth: i) technical change biased in favour of capital and skilled labour; ii) increased vulnerability of poorest to economic risks; and iii) a shift of economic power towards more mobile factors of production, i.e. away from land. In such a situation, issues of social exclusion eventually creep into policy arenas, in which there are three critical debates relevant for more-inclusive development of the livestock sector: (i) the first is about the importance of considering human and institutional reforms for livestock to be used as a leverage for poverty reduction; (ii) the second is about planning processes that provide scope for development of area specific/ago-climatic policy implementation strategies, i.e. that are context-specific and thus able to address constraints which are relevant to the majority of population; (iii) that third is about policy targeting, i.e. about focusing on producers, the majority of which are smallholders, rather than on production per se. For now, however, there is no conclusive roadmap that proves that despite synergy, a purposeful effort has been made to dovetail poverty with productivity other than mere mention in multiple policies.

4.2 Distinguishing Features of Livestock Policy Causality and Impacts

A central feature of Government led policy formulation and implementation is the linear approach to planning, which mechanically links a series of strategic inputs to identified outcomes and impacts. This linear policy sequence (see Box 3) primarily entails: (i) defining the policy objective(s); (ii) selecting the appropriate policy instruments given the existing constraints; (iii) applying the policy instruments (Sutton, 1999). These policy blueprints provide planners with controllable yardsticks and have been greatly used in traditional planning right from the War time plans to the Marshall plans to today’s policies. Planning, in fact, is often considered apolitical and technical in nature and is driven by specific and measurable indicators, thereby reducing the risks of

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9 If we simplify the livestock equation then for livestock to be productive (and thereby become an engine of growth), the availability of fodder/feed is a must. Herein worrisome trends emerge when we undertake comparative analysis between recent and past NSSO figures which reveal that between 1960 to 2003 the number of land holdings doubled from 51 million to 101 million and the total cultivable area declined from 133 million hectares to 108 million. Accordingly the percentage of marginal landholdings has increased from 39.1 percent in 1960s to 71 percent in 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Holding</th>
<th>Table 3: Percentage of Operational Holding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Medium</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Sizes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSSO multiple rounds

The tenants of the livestock policies analyzed before needs to be reviewed in the light of reducing land ownership patterns. The truth is that there is less and less private land for fodder and feed, sea changes are occurring in cropping patterns from food crops to cash crops and depletion of common property resources leaves no other alternative resources. In this scenario, the productivity parameters of livestock are severely challenged.

10 Ordering of social benefits that continue to be accrued along existing lines of social division (Green, 2005).
failure and error; it is often founded on narratives of research and science that provide rational, logical and consistent ‘truths’ to feed policy implementation. In the end, implicit in these linear models are the hazards of what James Scott (1998) calls ‘high-modernist ideology’ that leads to an aggressive reliance on scientific progress to satisfy policy ends, upgrade livelihoods, and resolve social dilemmas.

Diagram 2: The Linear Policy Model.

Recognizing & Defining the Problem to be addressed

Identifying Policy Solutions

Choosing the Best Fit Policy Option

Implementing the Policy

Evaluating the outcome

Source: Sutton (1999)

In the Indian Livestock scenario adherence to linear prescriptions are observable in the manner several livestock initiatives have been designed, implemented and evaluated. It is however wrong to say that the policies themselves lacked holism, i.e. that they looked at the livestock system with no appreciation of the broader national/state context. The first Five Year Plan itself spoke about the fact that our feed and fodder resources were inadequate to feed the country’s livestock requirements and proposed development of common grazing grounds. The third Five Year Plan stressed on the mixed farming approach through a system in which crop production and animal husbandry are dovetailed and flagged the importance of piggery and poultry for the weaker sections. The National Agriculture Policy (Vision 2020) proposed:

There is a need to strengthen adaptive research and technology assessment, refinement and transfer capabilities so that the existing wide technology transfer gaps are bridged. For this, an appropriate network of extension service needs to be created to stimulate and encourage both top-down and bottom-up flows of information between farmers, extension workers, and research scientists to promote the generation, adoption, and evaluation of location specific farm technologies (NAP, Vision 2020).

However if policy is the instrument through which governments organize diagnosis and prescriptive enquiry (McGovern and Yacobucci, 2008), then its realization happens through resource allocations mounted on specific schemes. Sutton (1999) notes that both policy formulation and implementation are the outcome of processes wherein priority is ultimately given to those elements that either have strong scientific validation (like AI delivery) or have past proven success (like Dairy), reflecting what Simon (1991) termed ‘bonded
rationality’, i.e. the fact that decisions / actions of individuals are ultimately constrained by the information / knowledge they have. Review of XI Plan propositions (see table 2), which aim at promoting and inclusive growth in India, showcases that, within the livestock domain, dairy continues to be preferred despite the fact that poultry is an equally fast growing agriculture enterprise (grew 19 percent during 1997-2002) - development in poultry, however, is largely led by the commercial sector and small-producers contribute a mere 8 percent to total production though they keep about 85 percent of the poultry stock (GOI, 2007). Further the 71 percent of marginal farmers who keep small animals are also not primary beneficiaries of policy postulations. Finally, piggery which is a fast growing sector and is the preferred animal of choice for over 80 percent of tribal people in 7 Northeast states of India is largely overlooked in the policy framework (ILRI, 2008).

Table 2: Snapshot of Department of Animal Husbandry’s XI Plan Propositions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Select Schemes</th>
<th>Plan Outlay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cattle and Buffaloes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Project for Cattle and Buffalo Breeding</td>
<td>554.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rearing of Male Buffalo Calf</td>
<td>300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Central Cattle Development Organization</td>
<td>105.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Project for Dairy Development</td>
<td>225.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Assistance to Cooperatives</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dairy Venture Capital Fund</td>
<td>300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Delhi Milk Scheme</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1539.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poultry</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Poultry Development (BYP and state farms)</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Central Poultry Development Organization</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Poultry Venture Capital</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>400.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Small Ruminants</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Resource mapping</td>
<td>200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Central Sheep Breeding Farm</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>213.00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Piggery</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Piggery Development ( resource mapping)</td>
<td>150.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>150.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further, linear paradigms - which assume that ‘scientists should approach policy as a rational-purposeful process’ (Lasswell’s, 1966) - disregard that not all policy actors are rational and utility maximising because the black box of policy making has ‘rules that are nested in another sets of rules that define how the first set can be altered’ (Ostrom, 1991) and is a ‘chaos of purposes and accidents’ (Clay and Schaeffer, 1984). The application of rationalist methods to policy, therefore, may generate a strong risk of downgrading complex political and social issues and, as a consequence, may propose inadequate policy instruments and public actions.
4.3 The Dawn of the Equity Based Referential

There are signs that livestock policy cultures are changing, as part of broader changes in policy visions and approaches. Productivity, sustainability and poverty reduction are beginning to be seen as ‘integrated’ in planning and implementation. Not only absolute poverty but also relative poverty (inequality) is given some prominence in the policy agendas. The development community has shifted its focus from fostering economic growth per se to maximizing poverty reduction, or achieving ‘shared’ growth - growth with a maximum pay-off in terms of poverty reduction.

At the international level, in 2004 the United Nations Development Programme established the International Policy Centre, now named the ‘International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth’ (IPG-IG), which provides countries with technical support and advisory services to ‘better balance national economic objectives with the deepening of pro-poor policies’. In 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) ‘to make the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central to lending operations in its poorest member countries’. Since 2003, the World Bank, the French Agency for Development (ADF), the Department for International Development of UK (DFID) and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany (BMZ) have been implementing the ‘Operationalizing Pro-Poor Growth (OPPG) Program’, with the aim to ‘better understand the options for policymakers to increase the impact of growth on poverty reduction and how they vary depending on policies and country conditions’. There is more than unanimous commitment to the fact that poverty reduction is the primary aim of development cooperation now.

As to the livestock sector, in 2003, the World Bank initiated the ALive platform, a partnership among, regional and international organizations civil society, donors, research and training institutes, and other actors involved in livestock development in Sub-Saharan Africa, whose major objective is to ‘improve livestock sector’s contribution to poverty alleviation and sustainable economic growth’ in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2002, the Pro-poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI) of FAO has been working towards supporting pro-poor policy and institutional changes in the livestock sector in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and has contributed to the establishment of pro-poor livestock sector initiatives both in the Horn of Africa and South Asia. The 2007 Annual Report of the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) of CGIAR claims that ‘ILRI’s strategic intention is to use livestock as a development tool, one that widens and sustains three major pathways out of poverty: i) securing the assets of the poor, ii) improving smallholder and pastoral productivity and iii) increasing market participation by the poor’.

At the national level in India, i) the National Farmers Policy (2007) reads that ‘the time has come to focus on the socio-economic well-being of farmers feeding the nation than just on production’, thereby placing human development dimensions at centre-stage; ii) the XI Plan proposal of the Department of Animal Husbandry indicates that ‘higher growth should be equitable, benefiting small and medium farmers and landless labourers who maintain bulk of livestock’ (DAHD, 2007); iii) the XI Five Year Plan (2007-2012) places inclusive growth at the centre of plan orientation. The chairperson of the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) has recently opined that ‘with national commitments to market-driven economy, it is essential to have institutional structures that don’t marginalise small producers; otherwise our economic growth is being constructed on very fragile foundations’ (Patel, 2007).
The question that however still needs to be asked is whether decades of growth and productivity led livestock planning and implementation can change through the simple infusion of the farmer first, pro-poor agenda into the policy discourse. In the Indian context, in particular, there is a possible dichotomy between emerging pro-poor policy frames, on the one hand, and the current institutional framework for policy implementation on the other. It is thus important to identify where the scope and reality for equitable livestock policy planning and implementation lies. The following section engages with inner and outer worldviews of livestock policy-agents to identify the narratives, rationalities and limitations that inform current policy and may define its future trajectory.
Harold Lasswell – who is best known for his transmission model of communication: ‘Who (says) What (to) Whom (in) What Channel (with) What Effect’ - opines with reference to policy making that ‘in the interest of realism, it’s essential to study official and unofficial policy processes’. This implies that the final outcomes of policy are also, and in a significant manner, determined by knowledge percolation, self judgement, informal interactions, etc. If we combine this with Gidden’s thinking on structuration, wherein ‘human actions are to a large extent predetermined based on the existing limiting contextual rules’, then the scope of revealing the present status of livestock policies as well as future vision of pro-poor shifts in policy making lies in separating an individuals personal orientation from their institutional or professional perspectives.

The following section deals with the individual worldviews of 22 livestock policy agents that include livestock reaers, politicians, government staff, teachers, donor representatives and para-veterinarians involved in the livestock sector. It aims to harness people’s own perceptions of livestock policy and implementation by de-contextualizing them from their institutional bearings and focussing instead on their individual orientations.

5.1 Worldview Findings and Analysis

5.1.1 Pro-Poor Vision and Reality of Indian Livestock Stakeholders

The following to questions were asked to 22 interviewees: (1) Inner reality: what are your perceptions/ visions of pro-poor? (2) Outer reality: how is pro-poor represented in policies or policy statements?

Table 3: Inner and out realities of Indian livestock stakeholders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee’s Level / Profile</th>
<th>Inner Reality</th>
<th>Outer Reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1 Ex Country Director (India) of an International Livestock Initiative</td>
<td>As an endnote to my posting in India, I want the meaning of poverty of livestock keepers to be better understood. Only this understanding can give them a chance to participate in growth and access appropriate knowledge.</td>
<td>Livestock based poverty orientation isn’t on major policy maps. I spoke to a senior MoA officer on backyard pig systems and his preoccupation was producing cheaper food for urban-consumers. He did not have poverty in his mind. So ‘development for poor’ is in disjunction with external reality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**L2**  
**Agriculture Economics Professor & Livestock Consultant**  
Most people who profess about poverty don’t care about it. In the policy domain, people cater to self-interests; the highest policy makers are most secure and will not take risks. To me its not just livestock but neglect of the larger agriculture sector that is responsible for inequality.  
The first question we needed to ask is what kind of growth takes the poor along? Poverty planning framed post Washington Consensus overlooked farmer capacities and endowments, which empower farmers to access opportunities. You cannot expect ‘trickle down’ to succeed when its pre-conditions aren’t met. I believe our farmers are capable, but our institutions might be unable to play a pro-poor role. We were cashing in on incidental growth till now but it is no more enough.

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**L2**  
**NGO Representative**  
It’s the poorest who depend on livestock. It’s unforgettable to see women in drought situations crying while abandoning their animal because they could not feed them. There are also examples where families sold household items to keep their animal assets.  
Policy depends on how you review the sector. When we evaluate from the classical economic approach, we look at total production level; when we look at it through a socio-cultural livelihood perspectives, we then think at rural families. Our country clearly chose the former. Livestock was always conceptualised in isolation, it is not a development narrative but a technical narrative.

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**L3**  
**Ex- State Minister of Agriculture, Forest and Livestock GoMP**  
Poverty persists because livestock is still not used as a tool for its removal. A family of 4 cannot eat 2 meals a day on <2 acres of land. Livestock helps tide over.  
Policy doesn’t look at farmers anymore; rather it looks towards Punjab and Haryana - the success symbols of green revolution. Even in these areas, production is decreasing but we don’t learn and follow blindly. If the government department ceased to exist, the poorest livestock keepers would not be affected much.

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**L3**  
**Field Level Veterinary Assistant Surgeon GoMP**  
Born in a village, my family’s mainstay was livestock. It contributed to my education. I decided to become a veterinarian and build my state’s agriculture base. It’s a government job and I also have job security here.  
The Livestock Department has limited schemes for poverty reduction. We do productivity management and disease control. It’s the Rural Development Department that manages poverty. I know that the poor keep goats, but we are told goats destroy forests, so we give them indigenous cows instead. That’s what the government wants and that’s what we therefore do.

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**L3**  
**Female Livestock Farmer**  
Animals don’t give empty promises. I get wage employment for only 15/30 days a month, and know that my goat and poultry will help me tide through. I rear them because they give me security and food for my children.  
I haven’t heard of the Animal Husbandry Department. Yes someone came and offered me a free cow but I have no land, how will I feed it? I sell my 20 kg goat for 1000 rupees (US$ 22) and it’s sold for 2800 (US$ 60) in the marketplace. Can I earn more? I’m worried because last year epidemic hit and everyone lost their goats. I cannot afford to take my sick animals to the dispensary and the doctor is 20 kilometres away.
Out of the 22 people interviewed, 20 found strong relations between poverty reduction and livestock. However this relation is rarely translated into policy making or implementation. The senior people and officers, who have opportunities to change the livestock schema towards a poverty orientation, show submission to ‘outer realities’ and issues such as ‘system problems’ or frame conditions beyond their control led by past narratives of modernization and market-lead agricultural growth. At the government departmental L3 level (field staff), outer realities seem largely led by adherence to departmental mandates, delivery of schemes and pre-fixed targets. Finally, farmer realities have limited relation to the macro-level narratives prevalent at L1 and L2 level or the fruition of the governmental livestock mandate. The issue is that farmer realities are sadly affected by these narratives because their inability to maintain a healthy flock, market animals and spread livelihood risks is strongly dependent on the right functioning of government machinery. And the government machinery is found ill suited to the needs and aspirations of the livestock dependent poor, as summarised by an L1 livestock policy analyst:

_There is disjunction between small scale/family based livestock system and productivity led large-scale creation of national herds. Research and technology currently caters to the latter. Livestock follow a preset trend of modernization backed by technology. Small-scale livestock development can counter urban migration but right now the principles onto which the sector stands are too generic._

One of the major reasons why livestock policies are conceptualised the way they are has to do with the income-based approach currently behind India’s reforms, which considers poverty as ‘deprivation below a common consumption level’ (Green, 2007) and pro-poor policies as thus those which lead to increased income; not necessarily directly but also through trickle down effects, i.e. ‘assumed relationships between increase in overall economy and incomes of individuals and households’ (Escobar, 1995). However, there exists a second notion of poverty as understood in terms of human development where ‘people are deprived of their potentiality to achieve a series of moral conditions and abstract freedoms’, i.e. they lack the capabilities to ‘achieve valuable beings and doings’ (Sen, 2000). A recent study conducted by the World Bank (1999) called Voices of the Poor covering 40,000 people across 50 countries concluded that poverty was different things to different people and referred to absence of power, capabilities and freedoms. Poverty also resulted out of enslavement, depression, poor working conditions, hunger etc. Therefore, while the income-poverty notion rests on assumptions about market engagement and increase in productivity as critical to poverty reduction, the capability-poverty notion depends on ‘enabling institutions to help realise individual capabilities’ (Gore, 1993).

The poverty-capability approach is valuable for the Indian livestock context. For example, despite the fact that women contribute nearly 90 percent of labour to livestock management (Birthal et al, 2006), routine consumption surveys often overlook women as disproportionately poor. A capability-approach would highlight that addressing issues such as social subordination, excessive workloads and exclusion may be critical to favour a growth of the livestock sector which is inclusive and pro-poor, and that technical-fixes - such as those suggested by some income-poverty analyses - would be all but insufficient to promote a socially-desirable evolution of the sector. The
poverty perspective chosen, therefore, significantly influences the strategies mounted to address it.

5.1.2 Livestock Science, Schemes and Service Delivery

Livestock Development in India is largely managed by the Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairy at State level and a similar Department within the Ministry of Agriculture at the central level. As a federalist system, the central government is mainly responsible for foreign affairs, trade and monitoring policies, while states exercise power over agriculture including livestock, land-rights, industry etc. However states often do not possess adequate resources and require central intervention through schemes and special packages which are usually in alignment with India’s seminal Five Year Plans, which cover all productive sector, including agriculture (and livestock).

Planning, in theory, is expected to emerge from the grassroots, with need identification at Panchayat11, block and district levels; district plans are then sent to the State capital where they are vetted as per priorities and forwarded for central government approval. The planning process risks to be undermined, as grassroots and local plans are often not inclusive or multi-stakeholders and are mounted on statistics, actor agendas, political interests and power groups (Young, 2007); at the same time, if local plans do not fit within one of the Schemes sponsored by State and Central Governments, they remain underfunded and unfeasible.

The intricate relations between livestock planning processes, science, schemes and policy implementation are appreciated differently by different livestock stakeholders though all, as shown in the table below, recognizes a dichotomy between farmers’ needs and the ways policies are currently designed and implemented.

\[\text{Table showing differences of views...}\]

\[\text{11 Unit of local self government, comprising on an average 3-6 revenue villages}\]
### Table 4: Policy formulation and implementation: visions of Indian livestock stakeholders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Suggestions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>L1</strong></td>
<td>International Consultant, Policies are a technical domain and to retain its efficiency it must be based on science. On station-scientific research is preferred.</td>
<td>Research is not feeding into livelihood systems and is often reductionist in approach. For example, Government research is oriented to western model of grain-based white pig production and speaking of Backyard Piggery isn’t appreciated. Government scientists cannot critique state schemes.</td>
<td>Policy draws on trials, past successes and textbook knowledge which are moulded into national/regional schemes or plans.</td>
<td>On station research is bereft of field reality thus policy percolation is low. Policy loops emerge with literally no innovation. Research stations continue to survive on inertia and not on critical thought. Science is important for policy but can start with wrong assumptions.</td>
<td>Alternative research is not recognized. The need of the hour is to focus on incremental changes backed by innovative research. No quantum leaps are possible with the poor. Let the government focus on small-farmer research while privates promote commercial research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>L2</strong></td>
<td>Ex- Director DAHD, MoA, Livestock is a State subject but States dependent on centrally sponsored schemes which actually become state policies.</td>
<td>The power of the centre is very large and bulk of schemes emerges from there. Policy processes flow top-down with a handful of people mounting national schemes with a selected panel of scientists and researchers contributing.</td>
<td>Policies/schemes are shared with state governments at draft stages for comments but once schemes are set they are not changed. Budget support goes annually to states as-per schemes and its guidelines.</td>
<td>Schemes are water tight with little adaptation. Adjustments between centre and state are limited. Traditionally schemes focus a lot on dairy, procurement and distribution of animals. Some past central policies were deterrents to trade like regulatory barriers for export of indigenous breeds.</td>
<td>For India, uniform schemes are impossible. We need to learn from Integrated Rural Development Programmes (IRDP), otherwise the livestock sector will grow like a directionless ship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>L3</strong></td>
<td>State Director DAHD, GoMP, The state of Madhya Pradesh has a budget of Rs. 5033-lakh (Rs 503.3 million or US$ 10.8 million) and depends on centre for 80% of its budget. The state Department has a mandate of livestock development through breed improvement and animal health along with enabling poor to earn livelihoods from livestock.</td>
<td>At the State level, the Livestock and Agriculture department are bifurcated and national schemes have a traditional focus on basic grains. For example, the National Farmers Development Scheme allocates 70% for staples development and rest 30% to be shared between livestock, fisheries and horticulture. Livestock is treated as low priority.</td>
<td>State manages to continue with routine activities, which are already saturated due to paucity of staff and innovation. Targets are the critical focus of yearly evaluations. No monitoring is done on outcomes and impact on livelihoods.</td>
<td>This sector is looping in past rural development orientation of physical targets and focus on monitoring investment. Matching state-centre formalities and file processing is cumbersome. No one speaks of impact and achievement of targets is seen as achievement of impact.</td>
<td>Increase departmental budget and allow for innovations in research and governance structures. Staff motivation is also a critical issue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While nearly all L1 respondents expressed limitations of ‘dry swimming’ research, a scientific or past success backed system was preferred by government rather than harnessing the hitherto unexplored plethora of grass root needs because the former offered a medium to justifying policy actions. However if we open up this linear paradigm a bit further, then ‘change should be directly proportionate to cause of change where it is assumed that relationships between variables are stable over time’ (Elliott and Kiel 2000). But such linearity is in question today, with growing susceptibility of agriculture and policy planning to environmental, political and socio-economic issues and mounting fears that the frame conditions within which policies were successful in the past has itself changed.

At L2 level it spears that research and policy converge at a point where there is a symbiosis between what research offers and what governments require. Thus could research be contributing to defining the rational face of policy? If we review this from Foucault’s (1998) perspective of political technology, it’s possible that political mandates could be rationalised through science as they often are. Review of L1 worldview in the table above is indicative of limitations of research to furnish innovation and field success in the pig sector. An L2 Regional Coordinator opines about the poultry sector:

_The performance of the government flagship backyard poultry programme maybe failing but it cannot be directly criticised by researchers. The notion of finding solutions with farmers is nascent and on station trials seem to be deemed as a good practice and are not challenged._

Further, large bureaucracies seem to prefer blanker policies. This rings true when L1 and L2 worldviews reveal that percolation of science within central schemes presents an interpretive junction wherein ‘on farm’ research is upscale to cover a heterogeneous population cutting across agro-climatic zones and social milieus. To the question, ‘who is the cliental of these schemes’, 13 L2 and L3 interviewees (out of 18) replied ‘livestock farmers’; a clear overdeterminate considering the plethora of livestock variations existing across India today. Many interviewees deemed this to be one of the biggest problems with blanket planning wherein a policy finds mention in state schemes and is completely devoid of any local adaptation.

The generalist approach often used in Livestock policy and planning (Orissa Livestock Policy, Andhra Pradesh Vision-2020, National Agriculture Policy) might perpetuate from past successes and current orientations of causality (such as A leads to B, B leads to C thus A leads to C) and when applied to livestock it leads to the notion: productivity enhancement leads to increased income, increased income leads to poverty reduction and therefore productivity enhancement leads to poverty reduction. Such linear paradigms might hold true in dry swimming research but, as Sutton (1999) argues, they are ‘too artificial to find space for implementation in the real world’. Thus while such linearity might present a workable cause and effect phenomenon, it maybe based on conventional approaches or powerful assumptions that should not be taken on face value. Furthermore, the planning process itself reflects inflexibility and poor engagement with different levels of policy agents. Commenting on policy agenda setting, Shore and Wright (1997) ask ‘who has the power to define policy?’ L3 field staff and farmers express disengagement with policy planning and concomitantly a lack of trust in institutional mandates with a L3 field level official opining:
How can you expect us to be accountable to the poor for anything we didn’t plan? You cannot take a stick and motivate us to work. Plans and targets come to us and we have to deliver, why don’t they ask us what will work with farmers?

It is thus no surprise that a policy that isolates stakeholders does not achieve stated ends and eventually leads to unintended consequences. According to Mosse (2005) ‘programmes do not fail in the implementation realms but fail in conceptualization that prescribes envisaged outcomes’. One needs to only review IRDP experiences revealing problems around ‘institutional and managerial complexity, lack of viable packages, high-targets, large scale action and supply driven lending’ (Chambers, 1997) to see signs of why current failure is occurring. However despite thirty years of discussions around participation and proof of failure of schemes that alienate stakeholders, the top-down form of planning is still preferred. This moves the government machinery away from the peoples centric approach, which warrants clear awareness of the ‘asset status of poor individuals as fundamental to defining options for them’ (Ellis and Allison 2004).

5.1.3 The Power Matrix of Livestock Planning

The question still looming large is who and what has the power to change policy cultures towards an equity oriented and pro-poor bearing. Foucault (1982) suggests assessing resistance against different forms of power as a starting point of enquiry and using this resistance as a means to bring to light skewed power relations and identify its strategies of application. The following section attempts to unravel these aspects. The following two questions were therefore asked to livestock stakeholders: (1) How you face resistance to power? (2) Where does the power lies?

**Table 5: Policy power in Indian livestock.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level /Profile</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1 Livestock Theme Head (International Agency)</td>
<td>Power is institutional. Institutions generate a matrix that cements their position through diffusion of agendas and loyalists. It’s easy to say Livestock needs to look beyond disease control, but there are strong lobbies at WTO and OIE that set standards and back disease agendas. Their outreach is advanced; swine fever in Europe will make headlines, the death of a few pastoralists in Asia wont. I can see the poverty-economic-health link, but others can’t. I have got into conflict by speaking differently many times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 Regional Coordinator (Livestock Programme)</td>
<td>Power lies in the narrative, the livestock ladder places ownership of high yielding cows at top. This ladder influences our veterinary education system - the base of all thought. In India, pig rearing is hardly in the curriculum, thus students learn a prototype. Most policy seminars are around dairy, when we speak of meat, the room is silent. When we speak of farmer systems the room is silent! Government may undermine a sector, but for example the goat is a poor man’s cow and the sector is still growing.</td>
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</tbody>
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12 Integrated Rural Development Programme and its allied programmes of Training Rural Youth for Self-Employment (TRYSEM) and Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCR) were major self-employment programmes for poverty alleviation. Launched in 1978, the basic objective of IRDP was to enable rural poor to augment their incomes and cross the poverty line through acquisition of credit based productive assets.
5. Deconstructing the Change Agenda: Unpacking the Pro-poor Windows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L3</th>
<th>Chief of Government Livestock Department GoMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power is the freedom to choose. Historically high class people never kept poultry, a king kept an elephant, the rich a stallion, a big farmer a cow, the small farmer a goat and the landless and tribal’s keep poultry. But I am powerless, I ask my officers to base decisions on logic and preferences but their routine reporting is ‘X artificial inseminations done, Y number vaccinated’. A tribal village is distributed dairy cows when they need draught animals. No wonder there is never any discussion on impact. Poverty doesn’t hurt us anymore... maybe having poverty re-enforces power for some!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L3</th>
<th>Veterinary Assistant Surgeon GoMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power is opinion. Until today, no one asked my opinion on policy or anything. I am a small officer in a large system. A book keeper has more power than me. If I don’t meet my target or report an epidemic, I’m transferred. Power is in the hand of the Chief and Director who make policies but I know the farmers reality better.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L3</th>
<th>Male Livestock Farmer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We are not powerful, only physically maybe. We walk kilometres to find work but our voice is weak. I had to bribe Rs. 600 to try for a BPL card.¹³ I went to the Panchayat, they said go to collector... in our dreams we can’t meet the collector. If we had power, you won’t be asking us. For someone who fights poverty every day, power is not an apt word! Yes Panchayats have power but they betrayed us. When they come next for votes, we will stand on our feet and ensure that they lose. That is how we show power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question, ‘Do you have power?’ invoked amongst 16 out of 22 interviewees, clear dispossession of power and an acknowledgement of limited influence, invoking Chomsky’s (1983) view that ‘people think that someone up there knows what they are doing. Since we don’t participate we believe we don’t control, hoping that the ship has a captain’. Some interviewees specifically identified central planning agencies, the National Dairy Development Board, heads of livestock departments, technical experts as powerful, while others were more subjective and clarified that strong leadership, building a subaltern¹⁴ or a collective, and generating new knowledge could bring in new power equations. Interestingly, none of the interviewees mentioned primary beneficiaries as powerful. When questions were asked to identify the micro-points of power, the following words (diagram 2) were found symbolic of power at the different levels of interviews:

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¹³ Below Poverty Line Card enables farmers to benefit from special schemes

¹⁴ Subaltern refers to perspectives of persons (especially the marginalized) or groups outside current hegemonic power structures who provide a new perspective to impending issues affecting them.
Analysis of these micro-points of power revealed interestingly that while policy at L1 and L2 level was considered a source of power, at L3 level it became a deterrent to power and was perceived as a binding force that limited individual authority and administrative powers. Another powerful element emerging at Level 2 and repeated multiple times elsewhere was Cow Rearing. It is possible that the traditional focus of the DAHD on dairy development has attracted a constellation of actors like national sentimentalists who promote an amalgamation of socio-religious beliefs to promote cattle in India. Because these groups have been active in Indian politics since shortly after Independence (Graham, 1990), bureaucrats are reluctant to advocate for policies that conflict with conservative interpretations that accord religious importance to cows. Foucault (1982) defined this form of dominance as power. Lastly, the focus on poverty and participation prevalent at L1 seemed lost within the complex structures of government bureaucracy. However, poverty and oppression emerged strong at village level, representing a causal poverty link that seemed fragmented somewhere between policy interests and implementation procedures.

Worldviews also revealed that dispossession of power seemingly removed self-accountability towards the outcomes. This is particularly relevant amongst field level government staff, who at one level possess incredible power of delivering services and, at the other, detach themselves from overall departmental performance. Their dis-engagement with final responsibility sometimes shows the facelessness of bureaucracy where L3 staff were found saying ‘I'm just doing my job’ and ‘if I protest, I will clog the machine’. Lipsky (1980) highlights this dichotomy and mentions that ‘when workers don’t share organizational values and objectives, discrepancies between policy declarations and actual performance should be expected’. Power at the level of government field staff seemed subsumed within reporting protocols, data procedures and targets, which created rigidity in performance. As a L3 Assistant Veterinary Field Officer (AVFO) opines:
Two AVFO’s cover 18 villages and 8000 animals. With target preoccupation, we go to those farmers where our input will work. The risk of going to poor is high and we see animals not as means for poverty reduction, but ways of attaining our targets.

This trend called ‘creaming’ by Lipsky (1980) is known to be detrimental in ensuring that services reach poorer livestock keepers. Indeed a greater effort is required to deliver a pro-poor output. When schemes historically favour the larger number of farm animals, the poorest often get demoted to the lowest social order as a stereotype of governance management.

However, worldview analysis also revealed a growing discontentment with power structures at multiple levels, be it the poor complaining about lack of services, field officers complaining about the hegemony of targets, senior bureaucrats complaining about lack of impact and donors complaining about poor frameworks that limited pro-poor percolation. At all levels of interviews, people were joining associations or forming networks. Village level networking agendas revolved around lobbying for rights and services and engagement in thrift and credit activities. At departmental level, field staff aligned to power lobbies that helped in transfer postings and created windows for addressing grievances. Agendas of international agencies centred on intellectual thought creation through knowledge sharing platforms, best practice documentation, piloting and advocacy initiatives. While these trends are indicative of growing discontentment they are too varied in types and agendas to represent a subaltern of consequence.

5.1.4 Emerging Pro-Poor Gaps

The final point of analysis was to understand where current systems lacked the ability to contribute to a poverty oriented mandate. Special emphasis was given to identify issues (if any) within the government since it is the largest stakeholder leading livestock development in India. The following two questions were asked to livestock stakeholders: (1) What are the practical roadblocks to Pro-Poor Development? (2) What can be done to change this situation?

Table 6: Roadblocks to pro-poor livestock sector policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level /Profile</th>
<th>Perceptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L1 Livestock Theme Head (International Agency)</td>
<td>Even if there exist pro-poor policies, they are just generic objectives and often don’t specify plans to achieve results. For example, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are a critical poverty planning tool, and most don’t prioritise livestock. A cookbook of lobbies exists that pushes their own sectors. Even in pastoral countries, where livestock is the mainstay, like Niger or Tajikistan, PRSPs refer to livestock in passing. That’s certainly not enough impetus for change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 RSS: National Volunteer Organization – an Indian political and religious power group
### L1
International Policy Researcher

The length of bureaucracy and population coverage can create gaps. In smaller states like in the North-East of India, we could influence ministers and departmental heads to adopt a poverty focus. We undertook a joint study on farming systems with the Government of Assam having a population of 26 million and managed to influence their livestock policy and plans. Such an outcome is more difficult in Uttar Pradesh, which has a large bureaucracy and population of 160 million.

### L2
Head of a National NGO

Government doesn’t give farmers what they want. Animals need feed & fodder, freedom from disease and markets. Tight schemes cannot cater to this demand. I have worked in a tribal village full of sick animals and calculated 120 crossbred cows jointly yielding 40 litres of milk. This opened my eyes. Government needs to be realistic and pitches for smaller gains, looks after health and breeding and brings in civil society to build sustainability and privates for innovation.

### L3
Senior Level Livestock Officer GoMP

The biggest problem of bureaucracy is corruption, it kills the system. Learning from my deputation to Education Department, I suggested that instead of providing medicines to farmers (having limited shelf-life), cash deposits be made in banks which could be availed as per prescription when a farmer needed medicines. But there was strong resistance. A medicine procurement lobby stalled the process for 2 years. Finally Rs 10.3 million (US$ 221 million) were sanctioned and Rs 2.8 million (US$ 81 million) were used through banks, and 100% usage was genuine. The story with bribes for transfers and clinic construction is also dismal. Poverty cannot be addressed when corruption is so endemic.

Worldview analysis revealed that while impetus for pro-poor change emerges from policy, its implementability depended on clarity of delivery mechanisms. Most government staff expressed that clarity meant availability of short, medium and long-term sector/species wise action-plans backed by budgets that defined outputs and implementation protocols. Clarity on policy itself needed to be ratified at central/state level by politicians and civil servants, a stage currently open to influence by ‘political agendas, adaptation to past-successes resulting in a lack of client focus ’ (LID 1999). As a L3 Para-veterinarian opined:

\[\text{Poverty focus sounds good in high-class meetings to complete formalities. When Rs. 20,000 is spent to repair a veterinary clinic and the doctor never comes... poverty is reinforced. Even if we manage the current system well, we can fight poverty. We don’t need new policies.}\]

Furthermore, at the government level, 11 out of 12 interviewees blamed corruption\(^{16}\) as the main cause of implementation failure (procurement lobbies for medicines, for instance, were found to be very strong) and a symbiotic relationship was found between lack of motivation and engagement with corrupt practices. This is summarised by a field level officer:

\[\text{Yes the system is corrupt, but it’s also internally unaccountable. We have no motivation, no powers and our schemes are not vibrant. When a 30-year-old new recruit sees the mess, he looses}\]

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\(^{16}\) Defined as misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International 2008)
heart and becomes part of the system. Inside we all care for poor, some of us even come from those villages, but our external environment is limiting.

Lipsky (1980) says field officers are usually torn between accountability to agency and client’s needs. The problem often lies in the linearity of government targets and the heterogeneity and multiplicity of client’s claims that challenge the predictability of government outputs. It seems that reporting protocols and targets bind innovation. When asked what can change the system a senior livestock consultant responded as:

Only alternative leaders who can re-formulate the role of officers can bring change. This seems impossible in administration because officers are posted for short durations within departments. Maybe that is the government’s strategy of maintaining the system.

5.2 Summary of Findings

Putting the literature review and worldview analysis together, the following outcomes emerge:

(i) The strongest forces influencing livestock policy trajectory are not within the sector but exist within economic reforms and national agendas on how to nurture economic growth and reduce poverty.

(ii) Powerful narratives of modernization, science and productivity growth have long dominated national policy agendas, including livestock sector policies, i.e. have influenced and created adjustment pressures on livestock policy planning and delivery.

(iii) Trends are indicative of dichotomous development of Indian society, as well as of the livestock sector. Despite symbiotic relation being found between poverty reduction and livestock productivity, in fact, pro-poor policy percolation and implementation has been low; a pro-poor ‘development narrative’, which also encompasses the livestock sector, is gaining thus consensus.

(iv) Policy design and implementation, however, still shows alignment to policy mandates of increased productivity, which will trickle down to and benefit the poor. Historical lineages, adherence to science, lobby groups, power of past successes have created strong policy looping mechanisms.

(v) Policy planning still functions in a scientific and bureaucratic vacuum, though both institutional and field realities are resistant and a-symbiotic to this linearity.

(vi) The centralise culture of governance has remained unchanged and still exercises strong control, with decentralized policy planning being a myth to a large extent; bureaucracy is thus unable to innovate: policy implementers face limitations due to hegemonic directives, while at the same time government staff adhering to tacit protocols create resistance to innovative top-down policies and limits engagement with farmers.

These outcomes highlight Foucault’s notion that ‘historical contexts influences how individuals interpret and implement practices’ (Lynch, 2004). At one level, retrospective analysis indicates that effects of livestock policies
are by-products of knowledge loops while their effect on the poorest seems of little relevance. At the other, it reflects organizational inability to take risks to innovate due to system rigidity and alignment to past prototypes when frame conditions themselves have changed. These outcomes show close symmetry to structuration maintenance through 'reinforcement of traditions, moral codes and institutional ideas' (Giddens 1981). Thus, if change is a must within the Indian livestock schema, then it must be strong enough to shift current structures. The following section deals with this aspect in detail and defines new approaches, prescriptions and applicability of the poverty mandate though case review of field level practices captured by the South Asia Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Programme (SA-PPLPP), a joint initiative of NDDB and FAO.
6. RENEGOTIATING PEDAGOGY: BUILDING THE NARRATIVES OF CHANGE

Spencer Johnson (1998) in his metaphoric book ‘Who Moved My Cheese’ suggests that change is essential, and only if we were to re-think our strategy within our current ‘Maze’ can we continue to enjoy the ‘cheese’ that gives gratification and success. According to him, peoples’ inabilitys to take the risks associated with searching through the Maze to find answers to ‘cheese less’ situations is an impediment to growth. However he warns that lack of change can itself also be the road to extinction and suggests a need to ‘smell the signs of change early’ and let go of old beliefs in a timely manner because they do not lead you to new cheese!

His arguments are important in government structures because here change is not easy to achieve and requires forethought, innovation and risk taking abilities to implement it. In governance structures, it is explicit that change needs to be managed in a predictable manner so that systems can be adapted and people can plan accordingly. In particular, the prospected change needs to offer much better and predictable promise compared to status quo for it to be accepted. Failure is often not a luxury governments can afford and thus change is often seen as risky business.

6.1 The Approaches of Change

A plethora of approaches are used in development to facilitate change. Some of the popular approaches include the ‘Good Governance’ agenda promoted by the World Bank, USAID and DFID, which revolves around ensuring better decision-making through capacities and capabilities development, eliciting participation, building fair policy frameworks, re-energising institutional systems, creating transparency and accountability and decentralizing management procedures. Others subscribe to advocacy mandates mounted on ‘Rights Based Approaches’ that build on the fundamentals of human rights and often use a legal foundation to lobby with governments (some famous rights based movements include the Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Mexico and the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan lead campaign on right to information leading to ratification of the 1995 Right to Information Act in India). Still others propose mounting programmes on participatory frameworks to counter fallacies in linear and econometric planning such as the sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) that captures a variety of socio-economic dimensions of the livelihoods of poor. Based on a ‘systems’ way of thinking, the SLF has influenced the work of a range of donors including DFID, GTZ, UNDP, CARE, IFAD, Ausaid and Oxfam by: i) placing multiple dimensions of planning and sustainability at centre stage; ii) providing space for specific contextual considerations; iii) establishing links between macro level policy and meso and micro level realities; iv) highlighting participation as a means and an end to effectiveness; v) incorporating elements of dynamism within the design process.

17 A maze is a metaphor for the companies or organizations we work with, the communities we live in, the families we love and the places where we look for the things we want.
Further to these approaches, various summits have re-affirmed the change agenda. The Copenhagen World Summit in Social Development (1995) proposed that the new approach to address poverty should focus on building ‘an enabling environment for development’ often requiring changing mind-sets of participants and institutions. Responding to poor aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration (2005) placed strategies such as donor alignment and donor-government harmonization (interlinking skills, resources and agendas to common ends) at the centre of developmental planning and have called for refurbishment of the aid architecture.

Despite obvious differences in agendas, all these approaches break a few myths about linear planning for development. The first is the ineffectiveness of deductive and reductionist ‘blueprints’, which traditionally have not work in most development sectors except infrastructure. Second is the appreciation that technical optimums (for example in agriculture production) are conducive options only if they take into account consequentiality emerging from external forces (like environmental degradation) or internal problems (like rising inequality). Third, despite small steps towards ‘systems’ change that seemingly do not lead to large scale impacts, there is recognition that small changes in initial conditions (such as planning and design) can produce progressive outcomes in the medium to long term. Finally, it is appreciated that blueprints or rigid planning frameworks can in themselves not work anymore, and modern change management approaches anticipate on the growing stockpiling of unannounced vulnerabilities and thus incorporate elements of midway correction and redressal.

It is possible that these trends will finally turn the agrarian equation on its head and motivate planners to look beyond their current maze for smallholder growth possibilities. However, the current growth trajectory is harsh and no signs of significant inclusiveness are in the horizon, particularly in agriculture where we continue to cash in on the incremental growth brought in by the rich peasants and neglect the need to focus attention on the landless, small and medium farmers.

### 6.2 Knowledge Networking- (Re)positioning Policy Monocultures

The first step towards mounting the pro-poor changed agenda is the acknowledgment that past policy approaches have not worked to contribute to poverty reduction. The second is the appreciation that new knowledge holds proposals that might inform new attempts to address current anomalies. As part of this study, interviews and secondary research conducted provide some interesting insights about how knowledge cultures are built and changed.

The first insight is the clustering tendency of knowledge motivates individuals to adapt to institutional mandates and lead institutional mandates to adapt to global/national referential. In this form knowledge often represents a spiral held together through constant reinforcement of knowledge-power relations. The premise of this form of knowledge percolation is that much of what has been done and what is planned is based on making our ‘existing’ processes more efficient. However, its most recent fallacy is that there is little to indicate that efforts to improve efficiency have really contributed to enhancing effectiveness.
The second aspect of knowledge is the way knowledge is produced by individuals and systems. One has to only look at Indian livestock journals to find scientific papers lauding the importance of genetic trials that are expected to change the very landscape of Indian productivity. The quasi-monolithic nature of such research has a multiplier effect and scientists fear writing beyond typified aspects of livestock production and management. As a result, research priorities within livestock are not demand driven - but rather scientific-driven - and despite all the policy talk about being pro-poor and pro-farmer, there is little ‘out of the conventional box’ thinking. Looping of a standard research template greatly limits development of viable policy alternatives. A L1 Livestock expert opines

*There is a contradiction in traditional livestock research. Trials are always done in a structured way and the control on variability can produce results within the controlled setting. However in the real world, research needs to extract farmer’s messages. This is not a popular practice because researchers feel farmers have poor management acumen. If research was successful simply by setting up treatment and control groups then the livestock landscape would be very different today.*

Finally, this study showcased how knowledge is retained within personal and institutional memory, proposing a pre-defined order of things that influence our thinking. Foucault expressed that ‘all practices have a meaning and past discourses (knowledge) influence the formation of such practices.’ Through repetition of knowledge, discipline as a technique of power is informally institutionalized as ‘bureaucratic stereotypical tendencies’ (Lipsky, 1980) that do not provide much scope for innovation and change. Thus knowledge is found to be many things: it forms cognitive patterns; it decides which model is successful and which is not. For many, according to Foucault (1982), the knowledge we encounter fills up the total sum of our experiences. Change within such a scenario of knowledge loops can only happen when a new thought begins to receive wide attention through individual / institutional communication and grows in acceptance and outreach.

### 6.3 Building Praxis: Codifying, Validating and Learning from New Practices

Praxis means ‘from theory into practice’ and is an action word: for example, based on the premise that knowledge is socially constructed and influences human actions, Paulo Freire (1970) in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed spoke about popular education having the power to develop consciousness (*conscientizacao*) that has the power to transform reality. Thus to bring in change, newer action and learning are needed that are both evidence backed and based on dialogue. Here dialogue is a co-operative activity that is expected to build social connectedness around knowledge. While Freire’s thinking was more focussed on relieving the oppressed through popular education, his focus on action, dialogue and building critical consciousness has strong bearings on the construction of knowledge and how it can be linked to the change agenda. But who can
contribute to such knowledge generation? How can knowledge influence policy? How can science link with social innovations to inform policy?

A new generation programme of the NDBD and FAO, the South Asia Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Programme (SA PPLPP), has been attempting to set the direction to these questions. Based on a process approach, the programme identifies, filters, harnesses and shares evidence-based Good Practices in pro-poor livestock development. It adopts an iterative approach that places dialogue amongst major livestock actors at centre stage and uses good practices as a tool to influence people, institutions and policies. Its methodology is detailed below:

With an overall aim to ensure that the interests of the poor livestock keepers are reflected in national/international policies, SA PPLPP works through good practices (GP), which are a method, process or activity that has been adopted and is particularly effective at delivering a particular outcome; they are an efficient and effective way of accomplishing a task or set of tasks, based on repeatable procedures that have proven themselves over time for large number of people. SA PPLPP, through an ‘action, reflection and adaptation’ approach, assist (i) some people in ‘owning’ a good practice, because they have played a critical role in its success and (ii) help some other people, who have also been involved in the Good Practice, to document such practices and use it in a way to influence livestock sector policies and programmes. Further the programme is docked into country teams (in India, Bangladesh and Bhutan) representing powerful livestock stakeholders who have an interest in pro-poor and can use this knowledge to perform a catalytic/change manager role.

Select Good Practices that have the potential to inform future praxis are presented as examples that break certain myths within historical livestock narratives. The aim is two fold viz: (i) to use this insight to inform new directions in livestock Policy, Institutions and Processes (PIP), and (ii) to build champions and change agents who can appreciate that only purposeful ‘action’ can turn tacit knowledge into explicit ends that benefit the poor.

6.4 Good Practices in Livestock & Implications for Policies

6.4.1 Livestock-Livelihood Matrix of the Poor

In order to enhance the relevance of agriculture to support economic growth, planners have traditionally channelized funds and policy support to those livestock sectors that have shown past success. The non negotiable here has been that productivity enhancement is essential for both economic growth and poverty reduction, but it has proved partly misplaced. Take the poultry sector, for instance. In India, between 1985 and 2005 poultry meat and egg production grew by about 12 and 5 percent per year, compared to an annual growth rate of 1.5 to 2.0 percent for beef, milk and mutton and lamb. At present, with an average annual consumption of 1.5 kg of poultry meat and 1.8 kg of eggs (35-40 eggs) per person, poultry meat and eggs contribute almost 50 percent to the per capita consumption of animal protein (GoI, 2006). However, the poor are
not participating in this growth and the sector is being driven by large commercial farms. Yet, as the following good practices show us, the promotion of small-scale and backyard poultry production systems - which may complement capital intensive broiler and layer farms - could very much be an effective way to contribute to increased production and accelerate poverty reduction.

Case 1

The Kesla Poultry Cooperative Good Practice breaks the myth that poor poultry farmers cannot be productive. It showcases their livelihood matrix and highlights that the poor can indeed be efficient producers when the appropriate institutional and economic conditions are in place.18

Box 1: Cooperative development makes commercial poultry work for the poor.

Formation of the Kesla Poultry Cooperative Society in far flung areas of Hoshangabad district (Madhya Pradesh) has linked small-holders to fast growing broiler markets by building a collective, filling skill gaps, addressing technical inefficiencies, and providing support and marketing services. The Cooperative today comprises 459 women members (from tribal and dalit families) from 18 villages who sell birds through the cooperative to wholesalers and under the ‘Sukhtawa Chicken’ Brand.

The picture of Kesla was far from appealing in 1992. With just 38 percent of villages linked by roads to markets, low literacy rate and only 9 percent irrigated are, the average productivity of millets and maize was barely 40 percent of national average and the predominantly tribal population struggled for daily sustenance. Livelihoods were highly insecure, comprising earnings from rainfed agriculture, collection of minor forest produce and wage earnings resulting in an average household income of Rs.15,000 - 18,000/annum (US$ 320 – 390/annum).

Since scavenging poultry was popular amongst poor women, NGO-Pradan proposed initiation of a home-based broiler farming pilot. Its hypothesis was that it was possible for a larger conglomerate of small-producers to surmount commercial poultry entry barriers provided their production practices, quality orientation and veterinary inputs were entwined into a cost effective system. However, despite potential, rearers were weary of the risks associated with broiler production and initially found it easier to invest in a chick price of Rs. 0.3-0.5 (< US$ 0.05) for an improved cockerel laying eggs (compared to 5-7 Rs (US$ 0.12) for a broiler for meat producion), with marketing support extended by Pradan. Only in 1998 did Pradan succeed in convincing rearers to experiment with broiler production.

Pradan motivated the women (who were already members of Self-Help-Groups (SHGs)) to organize themselves into a Cooperative. All a member needed was one cent of land (435 sq ft), either owned or leased, to setup broiler rearing sheds which could house 300-400 birds per batch. Initial costs for shed construction were mobilized through bank loans and government poverty reduction schemes. Pradan supplied day-old-chicks to members, which were ready for sale within a 32 day cycle as well provide a 7 to 35 day

18 All the Good Practices reviewed in this study have been documented by the NDDB-FAO South-Asia Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Programme. Good Practice Notes and Briefs are available at www.sapplpp.org.
training (depending on need). It also ensured procurement of feed, medicines and litter material in bulk along with veterinary facilities. The cooperative de-linked production and market risks, as it ensured buying of ready birds at pre-determined rates and dates. Each cluster of 25-30 producers was allotted a supervisor who provided round the clock production support. Each member was provided with a production card to record all transactions. Feedback from the field was analysed at the Cooperative office on a monthly basis. Finally, a Governing Board comprising 11 elected producer representatives took decisions on performance, staff deployment, remuneration, input procurement, fixing of input-output prices, new appointments and marketing issues. Overall, members are able to rear 7-8 batches a year through which they earn Rs 45-80 / day (US$ 1 - 1.7/day) for approximately 200 days of yearly engagement.

Over the years broiler chick supply constantly increased, from 2,500 in 1998 to over 714,000 chicks in 2008, resulting in an average member income of Rs 9,000 - 16,000 per year (US$ 193-344/year). Today the net worth of Kesla Cooperative is Rs 3.5 million (US$ 75,000) in addition to a risk mitigation fund of Rs 1 million (US$ 21,000). The annual turnover of the Cooperative has doubled in the last three years and in 2007-2008 the total amount distributed to members was Rs. 6.72 million (US$ 144,000), a four fold increase since 2004-05. The risk mitigation fund gives it resilience which individual members do not possess. For instance, during the bird-flu scare, while other small producers were selling birds at a distress price of Rs. 5/kg (US$ 0.1/kg), the Cooperative used innovative methods of tapping rural markets and managed to realise a price of Rs. 15/kg (US$ 0.3/kg). Kesla Cooperative today produces 125,000 birds every month. In 2008, it supplied 715,000 birds and sold 1,360 tons of live broilers, which makes it one of the largest poultry production house in Madhya Pradesh.

This good practice reveals that addressing endemic poverty requires actions that ‘go beyond the economic domain’ (Shaffer 2001). The critical element for eventual success in the Kesla model was the appreciation that livelihoods do not emerge through a symbiotic relationship between increasing productivity and incomes but as postulated in the Sustainable Livelihood Framework comprises:

*a complex matrix of capabilities, assets and activities are required for a means of living. It is only sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base* (Scoones, 1998).

The productivity enhancement approach to poverty reduction focuses on technical fixes, which assume the existence of a somewhat a-typical production function which links physical inputs with outputs. This approach focuses mainly on building ‘economic capital and secondarily human and (perhaps) social capital’ (Shaffer, 2001). However, it has rarely proved pro-poor, because it disregards the complex context within which the less well-off households take their decisions and mitigate risks. Drawing from NSS data, a recent study of the IMF (Subramanian and Rodrik 2008) revealed that between 1993/94 to 2004/05, when the productivity-enhancement approach dominated, consumption of the richest grew by an average of 3 percent every year, while for the poorest, the growth rate was slightly above 1 percent. More importantly, inequality which was
manageable in the 1980s, showed a reverse trend in the 1990s when liberalization was at its peak with the Gini coefficient\textsuperscript{19} rising from 0.30 to 0.33 for the entire country in the 1993-94 to 2004-05 period. This fact calls for a refurbished understanding of the supposed relationship between productivity and inclusiveness. Thus, if we are to change the way the market-oriented framework informs equitable and pro-poor policy, the first recognition is that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescriptions do not seem to work and options of decentralizing and contextualizing policy benefits need to be explored. This can only happen if livestock keepers are seen as social and economic actors and not a commodity or target.

In the case of Kesla Cooperative, the mandate to sustainability matches procurement, inputs and market management with sector demands, production efficiency at par with acknowledgement of rearers vulnerabilities. The rearers themselves took 5 years to move from backyard to broiler production. Further anticipating on the volatility of the poultry market and its impact on vulnerabilities, the farmer-centric model of Cooperative was chosen that de-linked production and marketing. Social robustness of rearers was also addressed through mobilisation first into SHGs, then by establishing a cooperative and by building transparency in its management systems. Trainings to empower rearers to be efficient broiler farm managers and inclusion of issues such as bio-security as key components in trainings contributed towards preparing them for their role as entrepreneurs, managers and efficient producers. Further, anticipating on the existence of opportunities to access credit and seed money from government poverty schemes and from banks to build broiler sheds (each costing 36,000 rupees, US$ 733) proved critical in the initial setting up stage. Finally, the resilience and sustainability of this model was proved when the bird flu epidemic hit wherein, while price depression wiped out most producers, the Cooperative reduced production, utilised its risk mitigation fund and continued to sell birds in the rural market where people were less affected by the bird-flu scare. This case also demonstrated that overcoming local issues and building a culture of business ethics required years of effort in faith building, capacity development and a plethora of decentralised support services to maximise rearers capitals.

Drawing from this example, the obvious question often asked is, how a comprehensive approach to development can be used in broader policy making when the cultures of governance are tuned to make blanket policies and monitor targets. An option is that of incorporation of incremental changes within current productivity led initiatives. This can be done by broadening impact variables which haven’t received attention such as human, social and natural capital development, asset absorption; thereby moving beyond issues such as target monitoring and asset transfer.

Issues of social exclusion need as well to be addressed with a focus on who are the poorest, where they are, an assessments of their problems including how best to address them. Empowerment strategies that aim to build skills need to move beyond rhetoric of diffusion based extension (knowledge = efficiency enhancement) and systems need to be created through which iterative working with farmers is made possible. The basic

\textsuperscript{19} The Gini coefficient, which ranges from 0 to 1, is a measure of inequality of income distribution or wealth distribution. A low Gini coefficient indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution.
presupposition that deprivation is because of economic exclusion needs to also be re-evaluated in the light of the complex interplays of capitals that each stakeholder category deals with. Finally, if addressing inequality is key to government planning then the agenda of ‘inclusiveness’ needs to reflect in planning, implementation as well as evaluation as a process approach through incorporation of peoples voices through their representation in planning committees.

Case 2

The ‘Aseel’ Good Practice breaks the myths that: i. Desi (indigenous) breeds have poor productivity and the exotic ones are better ii. The poor need constant external support and cannot plan their best options; iii. That the best use of livestock is income augmentation.

**Box 2: Women mounting in situ conservation to resurrect indigenous poultry livelihoods**

Rearing indigenous backyard poultry is an important occupation in low-income and food-deprived areas. The Aseel is reared under backyard poultry systems and is a vital source of meat, income and is an important part of adivasi culture in East Godavari district of Andhra Pradesh. This bird is also the only resource completely owned and controlled by women - from bird selection to sale. Before 1996, this breed was severely threatened due to high production losses, infectious diseases and government policies promoting non-local breeds. As a result, although a farmer could potentially earn over Rs.4,000 (US$ 86) per adult hen/year, actual earnings were less than half. In a livelihood scenario where nearly every adivasi was steeped in debt, ranging from Rs. 4,000 (US$ 86) up to Rs. 50,000 (US$ 1,075) this loss was becoming too critical to ignore.

In 1996, an NGO consortium (Anthra, Girijana Deepika and Yakshi) initiated in situ disease prevention and bio-diversity conservation strategies in 24 villages. The fundamental objective was to enhance the capabilities of the local stakeholders especially the Gottis (women’s groups) to manage local poultry development. Activities included training of poultry health workers and introduction of basic healthcare practices - such as vaccinations and de-worming, as also encouraging use of local herbal remedies in prevention and first aid, building women’s capacities to effectively manage and feed their poultry, empowering women’s advocacy skills and encouraging poultry asset creation under the Vaata system (based on a traditional system of rotational asset sharing and building, wherein each women who had received a free aseel bird, passed on the first offspring’s to other women).

The innovation through Vaata, turned out to be highly effective in re-building Aseel population. Over the past eight years, the offspring of the original germplasm spread to 74 women in 6 villages through this Vaata. This activity was funded by women themselves with Rs 60,000 (US$ 1,288) of group savings serving as seed money for purchasing birds. The women also started a village revolving fund for medicines and vaccinations wherein each member contributed Rs.3-5 (US$ 0.8) month for disease control. To support this initiative, the NGO consortium trained 71 animal health workers between 1992 and 2004, of which 60 percent were women. The consortium also worked with Gottis to improve the nutritional base of poultry, given massive shifts to commercial crops such as cotton and tobacco which were lowering the nutritional plane for birds and humans.
In 2002, the NGO consortium encouraged the Gottis to manage implementation themselves. By January 2008, the Gottis had organised themselves into a federation called Tholakari Adivasi Mahila Vedika with a membership of 1800 women across 80 villages. This federation recently advocated for and mobilised Ranikhet (Newcastle) vaccinations from the Animal Husbandry Department and initiated vaccination drives reaching out to 12,000 birds across 45 villages. In 2008, a survey highlighted reduction in chick mortality from 70 to 17 percent, a marginal increase in per-capita poultry holding rising to 11.2 birds in 2008 from 5-10 birds in 1998; much higher home consumption of birds than before, which improved family nutrition. During the period 1998-2008, a threefold increase in average income from poultry from Rs 1800 (US$ 39) to Rs 5,750 (US$ 124) was also documented. Finally the paucity of poultry feed/scavenging material due to shift in cropping system (less tobacco, cotton and more food crops) was reversed with a surveys revealing that 1032 farmers had cultivated 20 different food crops in 3096 acres in 2008, which was 60 percent of total available cultivable land in contrast to 1998, where the average coverage of food crops was below 25 percent.

This good practice emerges at a time when citizen’s reports on national bio-diversity (2005) have declared all 18 of India’s indigenous poultry breeds as threatened. Independent studies had also confirmed that the percentage of native birds in total poultry population has dropped from 50 percent about 30 years ago to about 10 percent at the end of the 1990s (Rangnekar and Rangnekar, 1999). The Indian poultry picture is thus lopsided wherein, on one hand, impressive production figures place India as the world’s fifth largest egg producer and eighteenth largest producer of broiler; while, on the other hand, these figures do not recall the fact that traditional rearing habits, poultry bio-diversity and livelihoods of the poor - for whom ‘a few indigenous birds’ are often the only bankable assets - are being lost. This case showcases that indigenous breeds play a critical role in building local livelihoods. It also highlights the need to acknowledge efforts of indigenous people in preserving their valuable genetic resources.

In East Godavari women took informed decisions to address problems of depleting germplasm and resurrected Aseel population through their own traditional Vaata management system. Further, today the federation developed as part of the poultry initiative works as a hub for women to raise their concerns, rights, and discuss livelihood issues.

From the perspective of the food security narrative, the rearing habits of the adivasis are also of particular relevance. The good practice revealed that rearers kept poultry firstly for home consumption and as a valued community asset, then for quick cash and incidental expenses like tuition fees, medical needs and to purchase household items. Post intervention, many rearers had even enhanced home consumption of meat and eggs. Further, the poultry initiative also empowered the rearers to revert to cultivating food crops (millet and paddy) from commercial crops (cotton and tobacco). This contributed to enhancing the diet diversity of humans and left adequate crop-by products such as fodder for ruminants and feed for poultry.

In a scenario of growing food insecurity and price rise wherein agriculture productivity has reached a plateau in yield, land holdings are becoming smaller, urbanization and industrialization have not alleviated hunger and there is less food gain per person in India (IFPRI 2008), the fact that poor households seldom produce enough to feed themselves (making them net
food buyers) places them in a vulnerable situation. Furthermore, FAO (2008b) estimates show that, globally, the number of chronically hungry people in 2007 has increased by 75 million from 848 million in 2003–05 and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of hungry people by 2015 looks unlikely despite rapid economic growth rates. In such a scenario, the fact that local poultry can contribute to household food security, provide a nutritious source of high protein, build assets and capabilities is invaluable. This thinking is reiterated in Maxwell’s (2003) conceptualization of food security which is:

one that leads to better nutrition but also leads to increased asset holdings, increased consumption, promotes equality, underpins freedom, is environmentally sustainable and enhances social inclusion.

In the policy arena, despite positive policy frame conditions like the Brundtland Report (1987) that drew attention to mounting loss of biodiversity of plants and animals, national responses to biodiversity loss continue to flag issues such as indiscriminate breeding and lack of farmer’s awareness as impediments to productivity. In order to align policy frameworks to the positive potential of indigenous animals, it is necessary to refurbish the perception that exotic breeds suit all communities. Not every improved / exotic bird and exogenous options are better than local birds and home grown solutions, and the meaning of ‘asset maximization’ is relative depending on stakeholder needs and capacities.

The knowledge base and traditional acumen of people like the adivasis of East Godavari might be old, but it proves that people prefer different characteristics and hence outputs from their animals for a multitude of reasons. In this scenario, a generic decision to superimpose an exotic animal without evaluations based on field studies can prove detrimental to already vulnerable livelihoods. Governments need to respect this diversity and invest in scientific research on indigenous breeds. Finally, a shift in mindset of field officers regarding the value of indigenous breeds and their accessibility to institutions such as Panchayati Raj can build the bottoms-up administrative framework to assess demands, needs and potentials to inform ‘need based’ poultry development strategies.

Case 3
The ‘Ultra-poor’ Good Practice breaks the myth that asset transfer in itself builds economic robustness. The case delves into the popular approach of targeting asset transfers and showcases how a Government-NGO partnership can ensure asset absorption and reduce vulnerabilities of the ultra poor.
Box 3: Making livestock asset transfers work for the ultra poor.

BRAC (NGO, Bangladesh) runs an innovative poverty reduction program called Challenging the Frontiers of Rural Poverty Reduction - Targeting the Ultra Poor Program (CFPR-TUP), which aims to capitalize on traditional livestock asset transfer systems by linking it with community based selection, subsistence finance and knowledge support. The incorporation of this program into BRAC’s livestock portfolio came with the realization that their traditional programmes were unable to reach out to the extreme poor, who were often excluded from self-selecting microfinance groups. Under the TUP, poorest households are selected through a rigorous participatory process at the community level led by the local Gram Daridro Bimochan Committee (poverty alleviation committee). The Ultra Poor include: i) those who, despite spending about 80 percent of their income on food, are still unable to meet their daily calorie requirement; ii) those who have high livelihood inconsistencies; iii. those who are engaged in low paying activities; and iv. those who figured last in community led wealth ranking exercises.

While transfer of livestock assets is at the centre of the program, the process of choosing the livestock is planned as an exercise in building entrepreneurship, calculating input-output costs, assessing available assets and vulnerabilities through intensive interactions between the program participants and BRAC field staff. Further, before the assets are handed over, all participants undergo 3 to 6 days training covering livestock management and technical skills. Even after asset transfer BRAC’s officers visit every participant household once a week to help solve emerging problems. All services provided (such as vaccinations, AI) are on a cost recovery basis. The subsistence finance component, which allocates 15 Taka (US$ 0.2) per day to maintain the livestock asset till it turned productive, creates the right frame conditions for the poor to invest in feed, fodder, sheds and healthcare. Program participants are also encouraged to save part of the allowance (up to 10 Taka (US$ 0.14) per week) as contingency funds.

The transfer of livestock assets through this process has revealed the complexity of the livestock ladder. The ideal progression for an ultra-poor starts with poultry birds, then a few goats or sheep for fattening and for sale during festivals, next a cow followed by bullocks for farming - on own land as well as for ploughing other’s fields. Given the services aligned to asset transfer, till date there have been very few cases of people selling off of the assets and the success ratio of the initiative is high. In 2007, the program was functional across 23 districts and 127 upazilas (sub-districts) and plans to upscale it to cover 40 districts by 2011 have already been approved. The budget for asset transfer and absorption per household is US$ 300 - covering costs of asset transfer, allowances and program management for a period of 2 years. Though the present model relies heavily on donor grants and subsidies, the number of TUP graduate households that have moved on to enlarge the scope of their activities and to participate in microfinance programs, confirms that if grants and subsidies are a must then a clever management plan needs to be developed that ensures that the poorest are able to capitalize on the investment in the long term.

With an overall aim to build social protection in light of economic liberalization and increase the capacity of the poor to withstand shocks and stresses, targeting is an extremely popular governance strategy. Traditional ways of addressing growth anomalies revolve around safety nets like asset transfers and employment schemes which aim to ensure that necessary resources reach the most needy. Targeting includes...
multiple strategies like asset transfers, cash and conditional income transfers, food programmes, price subsidies and micro-credit as well as school vouchers and fee waivers for health care services. The Government of India livestock schemes, for example, have been heavily characterised by animal distribution (backed by credit support in some areas). However, experiences of managing such schemes reveal some anomalies, namely: i. poor target identification processes that often use BPL as a single window for target identification; ii. poor target absorption (lack of ownership, high mortality, asset sale) given the ‘one off’ nature of the intervention without allied support; iii. poor credit support (wherein banks fear loaning to poultry and small ruminant keepers); iv. lack of evidence of impact on sustainable livelihoods or wealth re-distribution despite political popularity of such initiatives; v. adoption of a linear approach that asset transfer = income, thereby neglecting the fact that asset absorption is actually multi dimensional.

Further, notwithstanding these impediments the new age cultures of government confirm that targeting is here to stay. If this is so, then the aforesaid case presents interesting insights on how targeting can be made more effective. First the identification component of asset transfer if superimposed or pre-fixed risks enhancing local social exclusion of vulnerable categories who may not be BPL. BRAC engaged with local communities to identify the potential participants that led to proper identification of beneficiaries. Second, a basket of livestock options were made available and analysis of costs VS benefits allowed participants to understand the dynamics of different rearing options and make an informed choice. Third the link to subsistence finance served as a buffer and incentive, but also enabled people to develop financial acumen and later participate in BRAC’s micro credit programmes. Finally, stringent follow up and monitoring helped enhance the absorption of the initiative.

6.5 Livestock and Sustainable NRM

Common property resources (CPRs) are resources accessible to and collectively owned/held/managed by an identifiable community and on which no individual has exclusive property rights are called common property resources (GoI, 1999). CPRs are an important source of livelihood to rural households, and the rural poor in particular: in India, the ‘majority of livestock rearing households belong to landless, marginal and small categories, deriving major portion of their feed and fodder requirement from the CPRs’ (Ali, 2007b). Most of CPRs have been however declining and degrading over the years, thereby constraining the livelihoods options of a large share of livestock keepers.

Case 4

The ‘Thoria’ Good Practice breaks the myth that technological changes are key to sustain livestock-common property resources and shows that simple, but tailored interventions could help regeneration and proper management of CPRs for the benefits of the livestock dependent poor.
Box 4: Common land and poor livestock keepers: FES experience in Rajasthan

The Thoria watershed covers 5 adjacent districts in Rajasthan and represents a typical dryland ecosystem with low and erratic rainfall. Commons constitute 30-80 percent of village land and contribute the local economy food, fodder, and timber, thereby sustaining local agriculture, including livestock, and producing additional services, such as resource conservation and recharge of groundwater. More than 80 percent of all households in the area are landless, marginal and small farmers, whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and livestock keeping. The livestock - a mix of cattle, buffaloes, goat and sheep - thrive on crop residues and fodder derived from the village commons. With depletion and degradation of the commons, poor livestock-keepers have been facing hardships.

Since 1994-1995 the Foundation for Ecological Security (FES), in collaboration with BAIF Development Research Foundation (BAIF), has been involved in the regeneration and management of the Thoria Watershed. FES believes that effective conservation and ecological restoration needs to be done on multiple scales such as land-parcel, village, landscape and region. In all its interventions, therefore, FES facilitates landscape level planning and patch level action integrating larger landscape and ecological considerations into village level activities. FES approach, therefore, begins with: i. identifying ecologically significant areas, such as patches of pastures/grassland, forests, sacred groves, farm land etc. in consultation with local people and experts (foresters, naturalists and the like), and understanding how these components are interlinked; ii. assessing the current status of the CPRs to be restored through fairly rigorous and in-depth participatory analysis processes, with due emphasis on local and traditional NRM practices and issues related to competing claims on specific CPRs; iii. ascertaining the degradation of CPRs, with a focus on grazing lands, water sources, and agriculture fields on a historical time scale by consulting village elders, secondary literature and land records; iv. assessing capability of land, based on government or other agency criteria, with reference to its productive potential and specific management in order to make choices regarding eco-restoration and land management options; v. mapping land use and land ownership patterns (i.e. which legal category of land is used, controlled, managed and owned by whom), which is crucial to the design of interventions.

In the Thoria area, FES approach resulted in three major domains of interventions: i. bio-physical interventions, built upon local low-cost technologies, to develop a protected patch with a suitable mix grass and tree species that would provide different products to livestock-keepers to meet the feed and fodder needs of both small and large ruminants; ii. socio-institutional interventions, including securing tenure by consistently engaging with state government and different legal custodians of the CPRs (e.g. local government line departments and gram Panchayat) and crafting new or strengthening existing traditional institutional mechanisms for management of the CPRs and sharing of benefits; iii. capacity building and institutional development in order to facilitate bottom-up micro-planning processes, as well as to help local people liaise with governments and other external actors. These interventions resulted, between 1994-95 to 2004-05, in significant increases in grass biomass yields, grass cover, number of trees and water availability and, ultimately, in an increased number of livestock: milk production and sale raised by almost 50 percent, with direct benefits for the livestock dependent poor. The community-managed commons have also contributed to environmental services in terms of reduced soil erosion,
increased water availability, increased recharge, nutrient flows, thereby strengthening and supporting different livelihood components.

The Good Practice shows that, by well-managing CPRs, the poor livestock keepers may provide their animals with increased and better fodder, feed and water - thereby getting a foothold on a pathway out of poverty - while at the same time contributing to environment protection and rehabilitation. From a policy perspective, the Good Practice provides indirect evidence that compartmental approaches, focusing on one only technical or managerial dimension, are all but sufficient to sustain the development of CPRs, whereas an integrated and holistic approach - including enhancing productivity, sustainability, gender mainstreaming, capacity building, and equity concerns - holds good promise to sustain a pro-poor and inclusive regeneration and management of CPRs (Agarwal and Gibson, 1999).

Diagram 4: Holistic development of CPRs.

Diagram 4 presents a Four Window diagram which represents a ‘Holistic Development of Common Property Resources’. It includes four elements - bio-physical elements, livelihoods, access and use of CPRs-Livestock, institutions - and their dynamics (SA PPLPP, 2008). The diagram attempts to simplify the complexities of CPRs, and hence to facilitate the design of effective programs and interventions.

There are four major interrelated elements which influence the way CPR are managed by local communities: i. The bio-physical elements, which *de facto* constitute the CPR, such as trees, pastures, grasses and water sources; ii. the livelihoods which CPRs provide to a variety of different stakeholders, such as feed and water for animals, and wood as fuel; iii. the institutions, including government at different levels as well as local informal institutions, which are the custodians of CPRs and act in combination to determine iv. the rules and regulations which govern access and use of CPRs by the various stakeholders, including both their rights and obligations. These elements are important but, on their own, are all but sufficient to lead and sustain the regeneration and proper management of CPRs, as it is their interrelation and dynamics which ultimately determine the incentives and disincentives for livestock keepers and other stakeholders to cooperate to regenerate and
sustainably manage CPRs. This poses crucial issues for policy making as the traditional planning approach of the Government of India, based on quantifiable inputs and outputs, becomes ineffective when the focus is on processes, interactions and facilitation - as it should in the case of effective CPR management - rather than on technological fixes.

There are however bright hopes for the future as the Report for the Working Group on Animal Husbandry and Dairying for the XI Five Year Plan (2007-2012) contends that ‘the grazing policy for livestock in forest, including joint forest management with particular reference to high attitude forest, needs to be developed and jointly implemented by Animal Husbandry and Forest Departments. Regeneration and development of common property resources and wasteland with involvement of Panchayats and NGOs need to be given greater attention. It is proposed to launch this programme in 40 backward districts in 6 states having high population of sheep and goats’. The capacity of these programs to improve people’s livelihoods, however, will not only depend on the allocated budget but, primarily, on the willingness of the government to effectively delegate and decentralise - as mandated by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment of 1993 - to Panchayati Raj Institutions at the village, block and district level the definition of interventions and actions aimed at regenerating local CPRs.

6.6 Livestock Management - New Approaches & Partnerships

Infusing change within Government systems is not an easy task. First, there typically exist a number of rules and regulations and regulatory agencies, line departments, formally recognised local bodies (like user groups, Panchyats) who all have some authority to manage livestock resources. Second, there is a tendency to over-simplify things during planning, whereas field application reveals a multitude of complexities. In the case of natural resource management, if sustainability means to ‘meet resource needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations’ (Earth Summit 2002), then appropriate management by only one of the many user-groups is insufficient to ensure long-term sustainability of a given resource. In other words, what is often missing among current systems of governance is a roadmap of how multiple line departments, user groups and allied bodies jointly address build common agendas, pool together resources and mitigate conflicts for mutual gains.

Case 5

The ‘RAAKS’ Good Practice showcases how pluralism can be used as a powerful lens for forging multi-stakeholder participation within the government system. It acknowledges differences between different user groups in the social forestry sector and breaks the myth that rigid structures of Government departments cannot allow for joint synergy especially on conflicting issues.
Box 5: **Mitigating conflicts between livestock rearers and forest groups building convergence in forest governance.**

The 2002 Earth Summit stressed that Multi Stakeholder Processes (MSPs) are important for good governance because ‘they are based on the importance of achieving equity and accountability between stakeholders’. The Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural Knowledge Systems 21 (RAAKS) is a support tool that facilitates cooperation between conflicting stakeholders through problem resolution that helps people define mutually acceptable solutions. In India, RAAKS was used in Andhra Pradesh’s (AP) Joint Forest Management (JFM) context to address conflicts between livestock keepers and the Forest Department in the semi-arid district of Cuddapah.

Historically, forest conservation has always been a contentious issue. The AP Livestock Census (2003) reveals that the state has the second-largest population of sheep & goat in India (21 million & 6 million). Pastoralists were often not members of JFM executive committees, leading to their disengagement with JFM management processes. The general opinion was that the large herd size kept by the pastoralists is unmanageable given depleting forest resources, while pastoralists on their part continued to suffer from high animal mortality and poor CPR availability and were being forced to migrate or encroach illegally into forest areas.

In such a scenario a joint strategy that could ensure livelihoods to the pastoralists and protection for forests needed to be developed. However, given lack of an apparent solution, the Forest Department had imposed a grazing ban that restricted livestock entry into forest areas which was adversely affecting the livelihoods of pastoralists (sheep and goat rearers), who were also the largest forest-users. The pastoralist cooperatives (formed under the Department of Animal Husbandry support) were petitioning against this injustice, leading to an inter-department conflict as well.

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21 RAAKS is designed to help stakeholders gain a better understanding of their roles, performance and provides them a way to improve exchange on conflicting issues. Central elements of RAAKS are team work, focused collection of information, qualitative analysis, and strategic decision making. RAAKS uses a variety of windows to achieve a fundamental analysis, a transparent problem definition and joint recommendations for action.
The NGO Centre for Peoples Forestry initiated a RAAKS pilot wherein all related stakeholders were invited for dialogue. Participants representing government line Departments (Forest, Livestock, Revenue, Rural Development and Tribal Affairs) and NGOs came together with scientists, training institutes, pastoralist co-operatives, JFM heads and Panchyats to participate in a field-investigation of the problems in Cuddapah. After a brief training on RAAKS, participants clustered themselves into heterogeneous teams and carried out a study through interaction with primary forest-users. After the field research, the team’s shared, negotiated and synthesized findings jointly and developed recommendations that were presented to the Heads of respective line departments and user-group Leaders. The focus on joint-action and negotiation allowed the problem to be redefined as below:

Formulation at the start:
Conflict of interests between Departments and forest-users in Cuddapah, in accessing forest resources.

Thereafter during field study it changed to:
1. Destruction of forests by pastoralists;
2. Pastoralist livelihoods were also badly affected because of fodder scarcity due to low rainfall, non-availability of grazing land, farmer’s reluctance to grow fodder and grazing ban.

After negotiations and synthesis of results it became:
Need for joint fodder resource management to enhance livelihoods of pastoralists in Cuddapah District.

As an outcome of this process, the forest Department agreed to ease the grazing ban through local negotiation and sanctioned a two year pilot in Cuddapah focusing on fodder generation beyond forest areas. The Line Departments (Revenue, Agriculture and Rural Development) began supporting...
fodder generation activities along with sub-letting of land for fodder cultivation. Training institutes offered extension support, the local NGO offered to anchor the pilot and Swiss Funds were channelled for pilots, based on the agreement that, if successful, the government would have upscaled the process. As of 2007, over 338 acres of government land had been brought into fodder cultivation through 10 Fodder Management Committees. This proves that if negotiations are open and consent is established, livestock-forest stakeholders can engage effectively for forest management as compared to previous efforts marked by lack of synergy, trust and space for negotiation on rights and benefits.

This good practice highlights that, despite the fact that JFM has been touted as giving forest users equitable control over forests, historical preoccupations of blaming specific user groups for depleting natural resource still persists. This good practice suggests that cultivated respect for pluralism can create the right frame conditions for synergy.

In the aforesaid case the conflict between livestock users, forest Department and JFM groups was reviewed as an opportunity to redefine the boundaries of pluralism. Therefore a process of merging departmental interests with those of different forest users was initiated. This approach shifted the discussions from sectoral thinking - which focussed on fixed departmental mandates, state laws and regimentation - and stressed on defining plausible solutions based on a principle of joint enquiry. It also shifted from blame passing between departments and pressure tactics to a more realistic but significant shift in building synergy in services and coordination. At the onset of the pilot, it could have been assumed that the climate for discussions on convergence was premature given the polarity created by the grazing ban; however, field enquiry, nurturing joint assessments and getting consent from departmental top bosses set a positive framework in place which was later actualised through a successful field pilot.

This approach focusing on MSPs showcases how current institutional setups cannot function in silos by prioritising one issue over the other. As Sen (1999) summarises:

The organizing principle that places all the bits and pieces into an integrated whole is now an overarching concern. Unity is indeed important, but at the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that freedom is inherently a diverse concept...

Small steps have already been taken to infuse the pluralist agenda through convergence, joint planning and participation within government programmes. The World Bank-Government of Andhra Pradesh supported District Poverty Reduction Programmes and its Self Employment Schemes promote inter-departmental convergence and synergy on poverty alleviation, rural development and employment generation. This three tire model is implemented through state level inter-departmental committees which monitor overall progress, while district level counterparts focus on implementation of programmes. At the field level, programmes are operationalized through sharing of district budgets, identification of beneficiaries and by conducting participatory poverty assessments. While these new alternatives emerging in public sector administration present an excellent opportunity for change, their
actualization into pro-poor gains, especially for livestock rearers (who are often at the bottom rung of the planning pyramid), needs sufficient prioritization and planning.

Case 6

The ‘Para-Vet’ Good Practice breaks the myth that Para Professionals are ill equipped and under educated to mitigate diseases. It showcases how the setting up of an alternate vaccination service delivery channel not only reduced poultry mortality but also created disease preparedness and livelihoods for vulnerable women in the remotest of areas of Bangladesh. It highlights how small policy changes in service delivery may lead to actual pro-poor impact by moving beyond ‘Quality Services’ narratives (and their delivery by trained veterinarians).

Box 6: Poultry vaccinators mitigate diseases and save valuable assets through doorstep service delivery

Women poultry vaccinators deliver essential vaccination services and extension messages to poultry rearers and serve as a disease surveillance mechanism in all 25 sub-districts of Bangladesh. Actualised through an innovative partnership between the Bangladesh’s Department of Livestock Services and the nongovernmental organisation BRAC, women poultry vaccinators were identified as capable to overcome current service delivery limitations, which were resulting in high mortality from preventable diseases like Newcastle, Fowl Pox, Fowl Cholera, Fowl Typhoid, Coccidiosis, Gumborro, and worm infestations (ranging from 35 to 80 percent). Further, this model also aimed to triangulate the agenda of reducing poultry mortality with reducing poverty and empowering women by ensuring that widows, abandoned and married women (having basic levels of literacy) were given preference to be trained as vaccinators.

Under this programme, BRAC staff work directly with Village Organizations, which provide them the administrative link to identify and monitor women vaccinators. The primary mandate of the vaccinators is to: i. function as an interface between BRAC field offices and the rearers by procuring and administering vaccines at fixed prices and schedules; ii. vaccinate at least 500 birds per month, charging 1 Taka (US$ 0.14) per vaccination and working for about 2 hours/day; and iii. provide first aid and advisory support to poultry rearers. The vaccinators are initially inducted into a 5 day training (covering aspects like vaccine schedule management, cold chain maintenance, vaccination techniques, etc.) followed by monthly refresher trainings. Each vaccinator is also provided a free of cost vaccination kit comprising a bag, thermos and syringes. BRAC on its behalf manages a streamlined supply of equipment, vaccines and medicines to the vaccinators, and the Livestock Department supplies vaccines in smaller phials to BRAC field offices on a cost recovery basis. BRAC also purchases basic medicines for de-worming in bulk and supplies it to vaccinators at the lowest rates. The cold chain and financial sustainability of the model is thus maintained through close coordination between the DLS-BRAC-Poultry Vaccinators and rearers. The vaccinators are held responsible for their services by both the BRAC field staff and the VO on a routine basis through monitoring of outputs.

While BRAC estimates that it takes approximately TK 750 (US$ 11) to capacitate each vaccinator for their future roles, this model today reaches out to 2.47 million women poultry rearers in the farthest regions of
Bangladesh. Within one year of initiation, a marked reduction in poultry mortality from 21.3 to 7.6 percent was recorded and average annual income from sales from poultry increased from Tk 400 (US$ 6) to Tk 2,919 (US$ 42). This also resulted in increase in family consumption of eggs from 43 to 186 and meat from 1.6 kg to 16.7 kg per year (Dept. of Livestock Services, 1998). Finally, the initiative also created an invaluable opportunity for self employment for rural women with over 19,900 vaccinators delivering services and earning an average income of TK 1,500 (US$ 22), which went up to TK 3,000 (US$ 43) in some areas.

The first learning from this practice is that service delivery needs to move beyond concerns of power lobbies that stress on services being delivered by only trained veterinarians. This rhetoric negates local capabilities that can effectively counter simple and widespread diseases. This is especially relevant at a time when impact of zoonotic diseases is a real pandemic threat and the need for decentralised systems for controlling disease outbreaks is severely warranted. Bangladesh was prudent to accept its service delivery limitations in a scenario wherein:

The DLS with only four field staff and one Livestock Officer deployed at each sub-district had to provide livestock services to about 200,000 poultry and 50,000 cattle and sheep. It was suffering obvious limitations of human power and outreach. Around 40,000 Households reside in an Upazila (sub-district) in an area of 300 sq km with approximately 5 poultry birds per household. The department was unable to extend its services beyond the first 10 kilometres (BDGP 01, SA PPLPP 2009).

The case of Bangladesh has some important learning’s for India. As an example, numerous studies in India have revealed the increasing importance of paravets to supply ‘Minor Veterinary Services’22. SA PPLPP and the Swiss Cooperation in collaboration with the Government of Andhra Pradesh facilitated numerous consultations at village and district level, desk research, expert reviews, discussions with the Veterinary Council of India to define minor veterinary services to create a framework for para-veterinarians. In the end of this participatory process, the most recent government order notified as below:

Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby specifies (the following) minor veterinary services to be rendered by the Non-graduate Para-veterinarians in the Government service or in semi-government organizations, under the directions and supervision of a Registered Veterinary Practitioner (G.O.Ms. No 87, 18.8.08).

This order did not mention anything about services provided by the large fleet of local animal health workers (often trained by reputed NGOs) and renders their work literally illegal. Further it rendered many of the recommendations emerging from the consultations such as need for

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22 Often involving basic veterinary interventions, dispensations and extension services provided by trained / certified people other than veterinarians.
decentralised services redundant as well. It showcased the strength of veterinary and graduate para-vet associations and their ability to reinforce power positions despite emerging field level demand for different service delivery protocols. Strong narratives of international credibility, rudimentary nature of para-vet trainings and service delivery have been flagged again and again as reasons for this order. A review of the Andhra process revealed that ‘what often looks like a straightforward process of managing conflict and building consensus is often more conflictive and complicated’ (Ahuja, Gustafson and Otte, 2008). This case suggests that it maybe over-simplistic to conclude that processes, evidence and facts are the most critical variables that define policy.

The example of Bangladesh also reveals that only readjustment of power positions and a strong need for change can counter the hegemonic picture of power, politics and historical cultures in service delivery. Drawing from this experience, the single most important need is for governments to appreciate that the culture of government led ‘services for all’ is indeed changing. The new agenda is of shared responsibility, authority and information. The opportunity costs of weighing the veterinarian/graduate led service delivery option and the hazards created by heavy disease burdens in villages needs to be reviewed from the point of view of the poor livestock farmer who is the main sufferer. The reality is that service delivery budgets are shrinking, the livestock/service provider ratio is dismal, state lead models of development are being re-furbished, success of privatization is varied, and decentralization of services is emerging as a cross cutting narrative the world over. In such a scenario only change brought into power monocultures by asking ‘how should the government play a constructive role to ensure service delivery to the last mile’ can create a changed paradigm in livestock management.

Case 7

The ‘supply chain’ Good Practice breaks the myth that private companies can’t be pro-poor. It showcases how profit motive can become ‘the’ binding factor in a rural poultry supply chain, whose strength is the profit inter-dependence of all stakeholders involved within the value chain.

**Box 7: Backyard poultry value chain increases assets, income and nutrition in West Bengal**

Effective functioning of a rural poultry supply chain delivering 3 week old chicks to highly vulnerable families in far flung areas of West Bengal contributes to overall household livelihood development of the region. This supply chain has i) increased average net income per household (in Jalpaiguri, Murshidabad, South 24 Parganas and Midnapore) by Rs 2280 (US$ 49), with the poorest having highest net profit margins; ii) enhanced household nutrition, given a 10 percent increase in meat consumption amongst the poorest, and home consumption of 60 percent of produced eggs within all income groups; iii) has had a remarkable impact on women’s livelihood with explicit relations found between poultry rearing and women’s intra-household expenditure allocation, decision making and entrepreneurial capacities.

Prior to the setting up of the value chain, in the four districts of operation, people suffered intense livelihood insecurities and were relying on agriculture, livestock, horticulture and wages labour for survival. Nearly 85
percent of the poorest and 16 percent of the better-off did not have sufficient access to food all year. Given these conditions, labour migration to urban hubs had increased and a number of poor households had begun to send their male children to apprenticeships in Kolkata.

The transformation in livelihoods occurred as a result of the transformation of a typical poultry company (KeggFarms), involved in broiler and layer production, which decided to consider smallholder farmers rather than large broilers/layers as its key clients. KeggFarms, therefore, first developed the ‘Krouiler’, a village hardy bird that has an egg laying cycle of 150 to 200 days and an average male body weight of 1 kg in 6-8 weeks making it more productive than local desi birds. Then the company setup a smallholder-based supply chain to reach the birds to rural households in even the most remote areas. The supply chain is sustained through market engagements between dealers, ‘mother units’, pheriwalas (village vendors), and rural households. The company supplies day old chicks to 1,500 mother units across the state, which stocks around 300 to 2,000 birds at a time. Here chicks are reared to 3 weeks of age and are sold to pheriwalas who then travel to remote villages and sell chicks to rural households. Both mother unit keepers and pheriwalas make an average profit of Rs 3 per bird. The pheriwalas sell approximately 1,000 to 2,000 birds per month with monthly net margins ranging from Rs. 1,100 (US$ 24) to Rs. 9,300 (US$ 200) across four districts. Household rearers find easy selling opportunities within their village and local markets.

All the actors within the supply chain are self-entrepreneurs and have gained meaningful profit opportunities through the poultry business. For example, 60 percent of pheriwalas are landless and were earlier unemployed or daily wage earners. Today over 75 percent of them rely solely on chick bird distribution for income. Further, approximately half the poultry households belong to landless category and this makes backyard poultry an attractive and low risk option for them. Lastly, poultry rearers are largely house-bound women with an average flock size of 4-10 birds, who have seamlessly integrated this hardly bird into their household routines. This practice thus showcases how the private sector can create inclusive business models.

This good practice showcases that the value of policy frameworks like the MDGs or the XI Five Year Plan can be greatly augmented through private sector involvement. However, while there is greater openness towards working with privates and the Ministry of Finance, the Government of India has recently setup a specialised cell to actualise public-private partnerships in the infrastructure sector, the unsaid opinion is that private companies are often seen as rent seeking and profit maximising. These tenants of operation are considered by many to lack synergy with governmental objectives of poverty reduction.

But the trajectory of KeggFarms moving from a routine broiler company and investing in in-house development of a hardy bird suitable for the rural setting and its efforts in building a rural supply chain reveals some new insights in business cooperation. The first learning is that private companies are increasingly appreciating the purchasing power of the rural poor and, therefore, the value of markets at the bottom of the pyramid (Prahalad, 2006). The KeggFarms example provides evidence that business and social development can go hand in hand, by merging the research and technical excellence of a private company with traditional backyard
poultry rearing know how at field level. As a result of this innovation, in 2005-06, KeggFarms sold around 14 million birds to 800,000 farmers across India. So far the Kuroiler has reached households in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Uttaranchal, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Assam and Manipur, and has contributed to increased poultry rearers’ incomes by Rs 30 million (US$ 643,000) every year for the last five years. However, despite this success, the role of the government within this supply chain is largely ambiguous. In West Bengal, for instance, there are little complementarities between Keggfarms and the government machinery, which should focus on the provision of public goods such as disease prevention and extension services rather than on distribution of day-old chicks to rural dwellers at subsidized rate. Chick mortality is as high as 20 percent in some districts and despite national schemes there is little provision for linking credit at Mother Unit level. In West Bengal, therefore, the conventional wisdom of de-linking government services with private initiatives continues to persist, whereas the government should facilitate rural agribusinesses and enterprises to carry out profit-driven activities with positive socio-economic outcomes.

### 6.7 Implications for Policies, Programmes and Processes

The major insights out of the reviewed pro-poor good practices suggest that incremental pro-poor policy changes can be introduced through:

1. A decentralised approach which takes into adequate consideration local idiosyncratic conditions. i.e. that builds on a supportive administrative framework to further the objective of the livestock sector with line Departments like Panchayati Raj, Rural Development, Tribal Affairs, Forest, Agriculture etc.
2. A joint planning platform (especially with green sectors, rural development, finance institutions and anti-poverty initiatives) to mainstream livestock within the larger developmental arena.
3. A refurbished diffusion paradigm that support a system of incentives and rewards linked to livelihoods related outputs (e.g. change in number of eggs consumed) and not only to physical inputs (e.g. number of animals vaccinated);
4. Appreciation of pluralism and the multiplicity of needs (and therefore service requirements) of different livestock keepers and development of decentralized strategies. Pluralism enables groups to maintain their autonomy and still function as members of a larger interdependent community.
5. Investing resources to create new knowledge to move beyond technical studies and appreciate the needs of poor people while capturing their expertise and skills.
7. CONCLUSIONS: GOOD PRACTICES FOR PRO-POOR CHANGES

7.1 Summary

This study started with an overview of productivity based livestock policy and delivery instruments and emerging frame conditions in the domain of pro-poor livestock. It highlighted how past models failed to address issues of equity and inclusion and questioned whether institutional systems were equipped to deliver new pro-poor mandates emerging out of XI Five Year Plan postulations and global commitments such as the MDGs. It argued that past pedagogies of structure, power and rigidity limited pro-poor percolation despite long standing commitment to inclusion, such as Article 34 of Indian Constitution which enunciates that ‘the state is expected to promote social order of justice, economic freedom and equal rights of adequate livelihoods to all’ (Madan, 2001).

The study then undertook case review of ratified national/state policies and found evidence of a dichotomous development within livestock, led by hegemonic discourses of production and productivity which, according to Scott (1998), ‘allowed state to monitor single output oriented variables but failed to represent diversity’. The critical issue thus emerging was where did the pro-poor windows lie? To identify the same, the study captured the worldviews of policy agents and found evidence of structure and power maintenance and trends of resistance that compromised pro-poor policy and delivery. Review of the human and institutional contexts of livestock policy instruments also revealed presence of policy loops indicative of a bonded rationality driven by past priorities and top-down institutional mandates amongst livestock actors. To further identify the instrumentality of pro-poor, Good Practices were analysed and lessons were drawn for policy, institutions and processes. What follows identifies the major policy lessons out of the paper and ends with the study’s contribution to pro-poor livestock literature.

7.2 Towards Pro-Poor Policy and Institutional Shifts

7.2.1 Align Policy Objectives to Policy Instruments

It is now evident that the productivity-enhancing objective / the market deregulation objective / marketing boards / and even the equity objective are broad narratives influencing policy making in the livestock sector. The evidence captured in this study reveals that refurbishing these development narratives requires revamping of two rather mutually exclusive issues. The first is of course the overhauling of policy monocultures. To this end, the pro-poor/equity narrative, which is increasingly becoming dominant in India today, presents an invaluable opportunity to steer the livestock sector onto a pro-poor development pathway. The second is dealing with delivery mechanisms/ institutional bottlenecks / instruments and their path-dependency to past narratives. The situation right now is that while there are apparent changes in policy objectives to pro-poor ends, concomitant changes in policy instruments have still not
taken place. Experiences of policy formulation in Chhattisgarh\textsuperscript{23} as well as XI plan postulations reveal that mere placement of a pro-poor policy objective is insufficient to achieve an inclusive outcome. Given that many narratives leading livestock development are generated outside of the livestock sector and are brought in ‘from above’ (thereby making the Livestock Department a passive actor), the first responsibility of rewriting the rules of the game lies with central planning agencies who, according to Ellis (1992), are still aligned to neo-classical worldviews, ‘the goal of which is maximising social welfare through target variables like per-capita income and food-security that overlooks the fact that efficiency is increasingly being driven by endowments and capabilities’. Given the rigidity of India’s bureaucratic structure, no pro-poor livestock policy mounted at any level will succeed if rules don’t change and clear policy delivery instruments are not in place. As starting points governments can ensure that livestock policies are not built around animals, but around rural households and the role that livestock plays in their livelihoods (and focus on local assets / socio-economic conditions). The institutional implications of this shift are strong. For example, currently, the DAHD is responsible for ‘matters related to livestock production, preservation, protection and improvement of stocks, and dairy development’ but by whom and for whom is unknown. If target groups were specified (i.e. the focus were on households), the DAHD would have certainly a different objective. And concomitant policy instruments and evaluation would then be based not only on production indicators but also on impact on livelihoods / poverty levels.

7.2.2 Identify, Address and Represent Inclusion

It is no more enough to postulate that livestock contribute to productivity enhancement and national growth. For inclusion to move beyond textbook treatment and be adequately addressed, the livestock profile of small, marginal and landless farmers needs to be studied, their context, problems and aspirations need to be identified and suitable programmes and packages need to be implemented. Further, while Government of India has long since measured structural backwardness (with indicators such as illiteracy, power consumption, population density, industry, labour force compilation etc.), monitoring the impact of livestock on social inclusion will require statistical representation of asset transfer, access and use disaggregated across social groups, sex, place of residence (rural/urban/peri-urban) measuring income as well as non income variables. Shifting data representation to capture mere outputs (such as X No Animal Distribution and Y no AI) to variables that measure growth in prosperity, opportunities and sustainability also need to also be developed.

7.2.3 Dovetail Policy Instruments with Current Innovations

The study has revealed remarkable ‘inconsistencies’ in the way people in different positions understand / see pro-poor policies and their potential impact to livestock sector growth. A major learning is that for most

\textsuperscript{23} The Chhattisgarh Livestock Development and Breeding Policy was formulated over a period of two years through a multi-stakeholder consultative process and is the first ratified policy in India that places poverty reduction at centre-stage. Called a policy with a human face, its actualization still depends on new budget allocations, special schemes and packages as well as staff reorientation to deliver this new mandate.
livestock policy agents there is something - which one calls the ‘system’ / ‘outer reality’ - which constrains them in doing what they would otherwise do to deliver a pro-poor mandate. The immediate lesson is that a cultural change is necessary and we need to think of mechanisms that ‘hold agents accountable for their decisions, policies and faults of omission that bear on poverty’ (SIDA, 2006). The creation of transparency by removing goal dichotomies through ‘multi-stakeholder processes involving field staff and farmers greatly augments the possibility of policy ownership and its implementability’ (Minj et al, 2008). In this regard, current processes of policy decentralization that include transfer of political, administrative and fiscal responsibility to locally elected institutional bodies provides unprecedented opportunities to change the culture of governance in the country. This also creates the rare opportunity to build stakeholder participation through representation and voice. However, while political decentralization has gone far as representation of disadvantaged groups in locally elected bodies, fiscal decentralization is only partially implemented given the fact that states still heavily depend of centrally sponsored blanket packages. In such a scenario, states depend on release of central scheme funds cannot be accountable or responsive to local people and their varied needs. Infusion of a culture of responsiveness requires: i. acceptance of pluralism within current policy monocultures; ii. shift from target oriented reporting to outcome-oriented livelihood monitoring; iii. bureaucratic activities remoulded to incorporate pro-poor needs; and iv. dovetailing national/state goals with needs emerging from panchayat micro-plans by creating space for region/agro climate based policies and plans.

7.2.4 Learning from Good Practices
This study broke a number of myths pertaining to pro-poor livestock systems and showcased innovative good practices related to livestock sector development. At one level, the fact that there exist good practices denotes that the policy environment is not necessarily detrimental to livestock sector development. However, at the other level, the fact that all GPs have been implemented through intervention of an external agency (private company or NGO) indicates that the current policy environment is not robust enough to propel a government lead pro-poor mandate. These good practices provide some valuable clues about how one could improve policies, programs and institutions so as to facilitate pro-poor growth of the livestock sector viz.:

- Income is not the only output from livestock. The poor are able to make good and profitable use of their animals for asset creation (social and physical) and food security/nutrition supplementation.

- The poor require some support services (disease control, credit, insurance, advisory, organizational, backend / front end) to actualize the value of livestock assets, which could be provided either by the public or the private sector, or jointly by the two. As some of the GPs aptly suggest, whilst the initial start-up costs of the practice is high, the recurrent costs of supporting the practice are more than offset by the increased benefits accruing to livestock producers, i.e. GPs are bankable investments.

- Small-scale interventions need not be related to adoption of improved breeds / advanced technologies, but local breeds/(low-cost) appropriate technologies can equally suffice to sustain inclusive growth of the livestock sector.
• Within current livestock management systems, service delivery systems need to be redefined. The GP’s highlight the service delivery limitations of the government and a highly regulatory framework only limits outreach.

7.2.5 Building Partnerships is the Master Key

Mere global alignment to poverty oriented frameworks is insufficient to facilitate ‘internalised’ pro-poor change when institutional systems are unresponsive. In today’s scenario, the caretaking, ‘cradle to the grave’ (Hall and Midgley 2004) objective of the welfare state is becoming increasingly undeliverable given paucity of state resources and growing demand for services. The study has highlighted the indomitable contribution made by NGOs /privates as well as international agencies to livestock development. The GP on KeggFarms proves that investment in rural poor can mean good business for private companies. The GPs on Kesla Cooperative and BRAC showcase how NGOs can build sustainable income generating models and ensure asset absorption.

However, (i) despite the livestock sector being potentially profitable for private companies, there are still few companies willing to invest in the sector. Further, while new technologies and research is driven by the private sector, few are driven to invest in research specifically addressing the needs of small farmers and, when technologies are available, access by small farms is minimal. (ii) NGOs on their part are very good at facilitating inclusive decisional processes. However, State / National Governments tend to ‘sub-contract’ them to provide technical services to smallholders (i.e. they play the role of the public sector) whereas, given that it is much more difficult for the public sector to facilitate inclusive processes leading to a pro-poor use of livestock resources, public authorities should consider ‘sub-contracting’ NGOs to promote decisional (policy and planning) processes rather than to simply provide extension and other services, which are on their own insufficient to sustain pro-poor development. (iii) Both donors and NGOs need to shift from project approaches (that often duplicates governments work) and network for partnerships on pilots, research innovations and human and institutional reforms that complement the interests of poor livestock owners. They also need to support knowledge sharing and social action initiatives that challenge structural and power rigidities within livestock.

In order to realise the full potential of such partnerships, the government needs to facilitate shifts in institutional thinking and appreciate what each stakeholder can bring in terms of skill, knowledge and expertise to livestock development. A good starting point will be the joint re-evaluation of policy and regulatory frameworks to develop a conducive environment for livestock partnerships.

7.3 Conclusions

The traditional linear trajectory to planning must change. It is no more enough to say that policy is insufficient to deliver a pro-poor outcome as we must acknowledge that an entire policy loop comprises policy- policy instruments-policy evaluations and-policy feedback. There is now enough evidence to prove that economic emancipation of poor people cannot be achieved by applying blueprints. While on one hand there is need to
unpack the matrix of capabilities and endowments available to the poor, it is equally important to acknowledge that we do not know all the answers as yet. In this regard, the trails and successes actualised through good practice examples showcase the next incremental steps on the basis of which a more inclusive and pro-poor livestock framework could be mounted. Some of these outcomes may not be new but they stress more than ever that the time to change is now and the best way to promote inclusion is by reaching out to stakeholders own perceptions and draw out the pro-poor roadmap for the future- a promise long overdue.
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